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ABSTRACT
This Article critiques the prevailing justification for subsidies for
the charitable sector and suggests a new alternative. Existing ration-
ales are based on an economic model that assumes a single govern-
ment whose decisions are guided by a single median voter. I argue
that this theory is unpersuasive when translated to federal systems,
such as the United States, in which there may instead be thousands
of competing local governments.
I then attempt to construct a theory of the charitable sector that
takes account of interactions between charity, local government, and
national government. In this revised account, charity is most
important when federalism mechanisms break down. For example,
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frictions on exit produce too little jurisdictional competition, and
excessively easy exit produces too much competition—a race to the
bottom. In both these cases, the quality of the resulting government
services is predictably low, so that charity can be expected to out-
perform rival governments. Even if not, the threat of the charitable
alternative may supply competition that is otherwise missing from
the market for government services. These conclusions also have
implications for the law of charitable organizations, as I detail. 
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INTRODUCTION
Our contemporary theory of charity is simple and widely ac-
cepted, but incomplete. According to the dominant account, charity
exists to provide goods and services that could not readily be
produced in the for-profit sector.1 Typically, in this story, the market
fails because the products are public goods—their use by one person
does not preclude their use by many others, so that no one person
has any reason to pay for them herself.2 Subsidies, such as the
deduction for contributions to charity offered by § 170 of the Tax
Code,3 help to prop up the charitable production of these public
goods.4 This same story of market failure is traditionally the basis
of the economic rationale for government.5 Theorists distinguish
charity from government by arguing that government meets only
the needs of the majority, whereas charity can offer a diverse array
of services for all segments of society.6 
But as I will argue here, this supposed advantage of charity
assumes that we have only one government, one majority. To the
contrary, our federal system is designed to offer precisely the
pluralism, flexibility, and responsiveness that charity theorists call
1. Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 505 (1990);
Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable
Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 439 (1998); Mark P.
Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1397 (1988);
Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a
Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 391 (1991); Henry Hansmann, The
Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE
L.J. 54, 68 (1981); David Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531,
558, 560 (2006).
2. JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 100-13 (1995);
Gergen, supra note 1, at 1397-98; Hansmann, supra note 1, at 68; Henry B. Hansmann, The
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 848-49 (1980). 
3. I.R.C. § 170 (2006).
4. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 2, at 104-08; Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rogers,
The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT
INSTITUTIONS 224, 228-32 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism,
Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 701, 715 (1996).
5. E.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 5-8 (5th ed. 1989).
6. E.g., Gergen, supra note 1, at 1399. 
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for.7 Thus, in this Article, I argue that we must reconsider charity
from the ground up: in a world where both local governments and
charities can provide public goods, and government has massive
advantages in scale and fundraising, what role is there for charity?
Put in terms of tax policy, if the goal is to subsidize production of
public goods by actors other than the federal government, why
should we grant a deduction for contributions to charity when there
is already a deduction for taxes paid to state and local govern-
ments?8
My goal here is not to undermine support either for charity or
local government but instead to establish both sectors on firmer
intellectual footing. As it turns out, federalism often fails in its
goals. Each sector—the charitable and the governmental—has
distinctive strengths and weaknesses that better suit it for some
tasks than others. The law of nonprofits should emphasize the
sector’s strengths while leaving largely to government tasks for
which charities are poorly suited. 
But that is the end of the story. Let me begin at the beginning.
The father of the modern market-failure theory of the deduction is
Henry Hansmann of Yale Law School, who set it out in a series of
articles in the early 1980s.9 Hansmann admitted that he had no
particular explanation for why charity, rather than government,
might be the best place to produce public goods.10 That piece of the
theory was filled in by several other commentators. Some said that
government could not itself capture the diversity, pluralism, and
experimental energy of society as a whole.11 The economist Burton
Weisbrod, arguing from a purely welfarist perspective, suggested
instead that government services can meet only the needs of the
median voter, so that charity is necessary to satisfy demand for
public goods in excess of the level that the median voter is willing
to vote for.12 Weisbrod acknowledged that there could be more than
7. E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1991) (explaining the advantages of
dual sovereignty between federal and state government).
8. I.R.C. § 164 (2006).
9. Hansmann, supra note 1, at 55; Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit
Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 500, 623 (1981); Hansmann, supra note 2, at 843-45.
10. Hansmann, supra note 2, at 896.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 39-44.
12. Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a Three-
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one government but dismissed the significance of that fact in a
single sentence.13 And there have been only two brief mentions of
federalism in the literature since.14 
As a result, existing discussions of why we ought to choose
subsidies for charity over direct government provision of public
goods are, to put it mildly, incomplete. Again, the central problem
for charity is that state and local governments provide alternatives
to monolithic central government decisions about the kind and
quantity of public goods to provide, just as charity is said to do. To
be sure, there are limits on the variety that local governments will
offer, and limits, too, on citizens’ ability to move between those
jurisdictions or reshape them to get the services they prefer. But the
very possibility of such an array of options reduces the need for
charity to fill in. Moreover, the legal and economic literatures have
until now failed to note inefficiencies that arise when supports for
charity are mixed with a federated system of government. These
inefficiencies pose the danger that subsidies intended to increase
overall social welfare may actually on net drag it below the level we
would obtain through federalism alone. 
These overlaps and losses might be justified, though, if nonprofits
can produce better-quality goods and services.15 A system that
Sector Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 171, 175-83 (Edmund S.
Phelps ed., 1975).
13. Id. at 178.
14. Bruce R. Kingma, Public Good Theories of the Non-Profit Sector: Weisbrod Revisited,
8 VOLUNTAS 135, 145 (1997); Michael Krashinsky, Transaction Costs and a Theory of the
Nonprofit Organization, in THE ECONOMICS OF NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at
114, 124-25.
15. There is a rich literature extolling the virtues of privatization—that is, of shifting even
the production of public goods away from government to private firms and voluntary
associations. For example, Saul Levmore and David Schizer have argued that charity is
typically more effective than government, mostly because of supposed advantages in the
information and skill of its stakeholders. Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
387, 406-07 (1998); David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives,
Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 262 (2009). Many
other commentators have urged more generally that any private entity is preferable to
bureaucracy. E.g., GUIDO PINCIONE & FERNANDO TESÓN, RATIONAL CHOICE AND DEMOCRATIC
DELIBERATION: A THEORY OF DISCOURSE FAILURE 228-42 (2006); E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION:
THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT 109 (1987).
I find these generic arguments against government unpersuasive.  In brief, privatization
proponents overlook the possibility that many of government’s putative flaws are equally true
of charity. More importantly, they misunderstand the significance of the fact that government
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includes charity outperforms others in those cases where the
inherent limitations of local government diminish the public sector’s
effectiveness. For instance, residents’ costs of moving and gathering
information about rival jurisdictions can reduce competition be-
tween localities, allowing government to be relatively slack and
inefficient.16 In other situations, there is excess competition, as
where the mobility of wealthy taxpayers puts fiscal pressure on local
jurisdictions that wish to regulate the mobile or redistribute wealth
from them. Charity has a role to play in these scenarios, although,
as I explain, it is a narrower role than the expansive one currently
envisioned by federal and state law. 
With this new, clearer purpose in mind, we have a better sense of
how best to resolve many of the persistent puzzles of charitable law.
Among the important issues my analysis here helps resolve are the
question of whether the deduction should be prohibited for charities
that violate “public policy,” the debate over political participation by
charities, and the extent to which a charity’s managers can deviate
from the wishes of donors. My refinement also suggests reasons to
doubt Malani’s, Posner’s, and Henderson’s arguments for for-profit
charity,17 as I have set out in more detail elsewhere.18 
In addition to solidifying and clarifying the law of charity, my
analysis also makes a case for government. By identifying where
each sector has comparative advantages, I show that the privatiza-
tion advocates are mistaken. Charity and government work best
side-by-side, not with one or the other on the sideline. This conclu-
sion somewhat rationalizes the current practice of allowing deduc-
tions for both charitable contributions and local taxes. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I offers those new to the
literature a short overview of why others have claimed we should
decisions are the product of deliberative processes open to all, whereas charity can be an
instrument for the unreflective interests of a few. This single-minded approach can lead
charities to neglect the impact of their decisions on others, and research on decision making
suggests that any deliberations that do occur may be of lower quality than would happen in
an environment with more diverse ideas. For space reasons, however, I leave discussion of
these points for future work.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 188-92.
17. See M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for
Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 576 (2009); Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for
For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2021, 2031 (2007).
18. Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1218-33 (2010).
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subsidize charity. Part II explains the inadequacy of these existing
justifications in light of federalism and public choice theory. Part III
develops a contextual explanation for charity, in which charity
becomes an appealing option when there is too much or too little
competition between local governments. Part IV sets out my view of
the basics of a new law of charity, based on the rationale offered in
Part III. The Article concludes with preliminary suggestions for
other legal changes that would follow from my arguments here.
I. THEORIES OF THE SUBSIDY FOR CHARITY
Section 501(c)(3) of the Tax Code exempts qualifying nonprofit
entities from the federal tax on the income of corporations.19 Section
170 of the Code also allows individuals who make contributions to
those organizations to deduct some or all of their contribution on
their federal income tax return.20 It is this eligibility to receive
deductible contributions that distinguishes 501(c)(3) nonprofits from
so-called “noncharitable” nonprofit organizations, many of which
also are exempt from federal corporate income tax.21 Qualifying as
a 501(c)(3) also often results in additional state tax benefits.22 
Although the rationales for these three separate forms of tax
benefit are somewhat interrelated, in this Article I focus on § 170,
the federal deduction for donations to qualifying charities (the
deduction),23 and on parallel state law deductions.24 Explanations
19. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). See generally DARRYLL K. JONES ET AL., THE TAX LAW OF
CHARITIES AND OTHER EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 11-505 (2003) (setting out requirements of
exemption for various forms of charitable organization). This Part is derived from Galle, supra
note 18, at 1217.
In this Article I generally use “charity” and “nonprofit” interchangeably, but the reader
should be aware that in legal terms a charity is a subset of the general class of nonprofits;
charities are those nonprofits eligible for the preferential treatment of § 501(c)(3).
20. I.R.C. § 170 (2006). See generally JONES ET AL., supra note 19, at 1048-76 (describing
rules applicable to charitable contributions).
21. See JONES ET AL., supra note 19, at 728-53.
22. See John D. Colombo, Federal and State Tax Exemption Policy, Medical Debt and
Healthcare for the Poor, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433, 436, 439 (2007) (describing the history of
property tax exemptions for charitable hospitals).
23. I will refer to the § 170 deduction as simply “the deduction.”
24. The possibility of support for charity at the subnational level also raises an additional
set of questions about which tier of government should be assigned that supporting role. I
defer consideration of those issues for later work. 
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for why it may or may not be appropriate to tax the incomes of
nonprofit corporations are clouded by more general confusion over
why our system imposes a separate tax on entities.25 Thus, my
discussion is conceptually cleaner if it is limited to provisions
affecting the taxation of individuals who donate. 
There is now widespread agreement that the deduction subsi-
dizes the organizations eligible to receive it.26 The deduction allows
taxpayers who itemize to reduce their taxable income by the amount
of their donation, so that on net each dollar of donation reduces the
amount of tax paid by $1 times the marginal tax rate.27 Because
these deductions reduce the total amount of government money
available for other projects, the deduction is in effect a government
matching grant to the recipients of deductible donations.28 
Some commentators have argued that the deduction is not in-
tended as a subsidy and need not be defended on that basis, but that
view has overwhelmingly been rejected.29 These claims turn on
technical arguments about the normative definition of “income”
under an ideal income tax.30 
25. For a thorough analysis of exemption issues in a related context, see Daniel Halperin,
Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133 (2006). 
26. Atkinson, supra note 1, at 505 (describing this view as “[t]he emerging orthodox
account”).
27. For example, if I earn $1,000,000, so that I pay $0.35 in tax on each dollar earned
above about $350,000, a $1,000 donation reduces my taxable income to $999,000 and therefore
reduces the amount of tax I pay by $350.
28. Jeff Strnad, The Charitable Contributions Deduction: A Politico-Economic Analysis,
in THE ECONOMICS OF NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 265, 273.
29. See John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions
Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 657, 661 (2001) (noting literature’s rejection of these arguments); Miranda Perry
Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH.
U. L. REV. 505, 517 (2010) (same); Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The
Social Cost of Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 882-83 & n.199 (2003)
(same).
30. I refer interested readers to the fine analyses by Gergen, supra note 1, at 1414-33, and
Hansmann, supra note 1, at 58-64. Johnny Rex Buckles’s argument that charitable donations
are actually a form of “community income” that should be untaxed would also fall in this
category. Johnny Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contributions
Deduction, 80 IND. L.J. 947, 952 (2005). Buckles notes that tax law generally does not treat
as income money that is earned by an agent on behalf of a principal. Id. at 977-78. He then
claims that because charities often serve the community, donors can be thought of as agents
collecting money on behalf of the community. Id. But Buckles’s analogy is untenable. Agents
are not taxed separately because they have no legal claim on their earnings; it is never within
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Most commentators instead embrace the idea that the deduction
is a subsidy and argue that the subsidy is justified as a tool for
encouraging the production of goods that would otherwise be
underproduced by the private market.31 Mostly these consist of
public goods—goods whose use can be shared by many consumers
and from which it would be relatively difficult for the producer to
exclude users.32 Because of these features, there is a private market
failure in the production of public goods.33 Because every potential
consumer gets the good for free once anyone pays for it, individuals
have a strong incentive to free ride on others’ consumption, making
it difficult for any producer to turn a profit.34 Even if some goods can
be sold, the market will probably produce less than the socially
optimal amount of the good.35 Subsidies can remedy this market
failure by paying consumers to buy more of the underproduced
good.36
In practice, pure public goods are rare. More common are private
goods that also create spillover benefits, or positive externalities, for
people other than the purchaser. For instance, education is a private
good—schools can limit their services solely to the admitted. But an
educated population can be good for others, too. Again, though,
purchasers of education might buy too little education from a social
perspective because they will not pay for the benefits to the public.
Thus, although I refer throughout this Article to “public goods,” the
their control. In contrast, a charitable donor has a legal claim over her earnings and chooses
to spend them on charity. Even if she has some moral compulsion to donate or tithe, the
money is still legally hers. Further, to the extent that Buckles’s argument depends on the
existence of a moral compulsion to donate, it is indistinguishable from Andrews’s (now
discredited) argument that donations are not consumption and therefore should not be taxed.
William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 344-
75 (1972). 
31. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 257-59 (2007); Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy
Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L.J. 1047, 1055-62 (2009); Colombo, supra note 29,
at 698; Gergen, supra note 1, at 1397-98; Hansmann, supra note 1, at 68, 71-72; Pozen, supra
note 1, at 547, 552-53.
32. On the general theory of public goods, see MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at
41-48.
33. Id. at 44-45; Gergen, supra note 1, at 1397-98; Hansmann, supra note 1, at 74.
34. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 2, at 101.
35. E.g., JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 184-85 (2d ed. 2006).
36. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 2, at 107.
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reader should understand that the discussion also applies more
generally to any private good with a significant positive externality
attached.37 
Henry Hansmann’s theory of the nonprofit firm helps to explain
why, under this theory of the deduction, only nonprofits should be
eligible to receive deductible contributions.38 Hansmann defines
nonprofit firms as those subject to the “nondistribution constraint”:
they can earn profits, but must use these profits for internal
development, rather than distributing them to investors or manag-
ers.39 Entrepreneurs voluntarily accept the nondistribution con-
straint, Hansmann argues, so that donors will know that their
giving will not be wasted.40 The logic is that donors cannot easily
judge the quality of public goods, especially where those goods are
delivered to someone other than the donor.41 Without the nondis-
tribution constraint, managers of the firm could easily divert
donations for their own profit, making donors unlikely to give.42
Besides spurring the production of public goods, the deduction
also might inspire other desirable ends. In one line of commentary,
the charitable sector is hailed as a source of diversity and
pluralism.43 In this view, charities are sites for citizens to come
37. For fuller explication of the points in this paragraph, see GRUBER, supra note 35, at
179 (“It is helpful to think about a public good as one with a large positive externality.”);
MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 49-50 (explaining equivalency of public goods and
private goods with positive externalities, but noting that a smaller subsidy is needed to
produce the private goods). Similarly, in some cases, what I refer to as public goods might
more precisely be described as “club goods,” because in theory they could be “fenced” and made
accessible only to “members.” Some club goods may also produce externalities for
nonmembers, such as a park with historic social significance. The club will underprovide the
nonprivate aspects of consumption; for example, the club will not necessarily use the park in
a way that is consistent with historic preservation. For a survey of other arguments for
government production of potential club goods, see Amnon Lehavi, Property Rights and Local
Public Goods: Toward a Better Future for Urban Communities, 36 URB. LAW. 1, 16-24 (2004). 
38. Hansmann, supra note 9, at 605; see also Atkinson, supra note 1, at 617-18 (explaining
this implication of Hansmann’s analysis).
39. Hansmann, supra note 9, at 501; see also Hansmann, supra note 2, at 848-51.
40. See Hansmann, supra note 9, at 507; see also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 716.
41. Hansmann, supra note 9, at 506; see also Atkinson, supra note 1, at 572.
42. Hansmann, supra note 1, at 69-70.
43. LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 8-9 (1992); David A.
Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption—Beyond Efficiency, Through
Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 15 (2006); Barbara K. Bucholtz,
Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 556 (1998); John G. Simon, Charity and Dynasty Under the Federal Tax
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together to pursue common goals.44 They give voice to interests or
communities that otherwise would be unnoticed or unfunded, and
they help participants develop the capacity to be more fully rounded
citizens.45 This way, new ideas can slowly “bubble up” from the
individual level until they are more generally accepted by the
public.46 
Even if ideas never reach critical mass, these theorists say, the
opportunity to pursue and discuss them in a nonprofit setting offers
a chance for participants who otherwise would be shut out of
government or the market to take part in deliberative self-determi-
nation, a fundamental part of what it means to be human.47 And
these deliberations are said to be more valuable than comparable
experiences in government or boardrooms, because members are
more closely involved with the decision process and the effectuation
of organizational goals.48 Similarly, Levmore emphasizes the way in
which the diverse array of donors’ individual choices regarding
charities can enhance overall social welfare, a process he calls “taxes
as ballots.”49 
Finally, some supporters of the deduction emphasize its possible
role in fostering social justice, particularly in the form of redistribu-
tion of wealth from rich to poor.50 Although these scholars have
System, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 246, 253-54.
Alternately, charity is said to offer a nonbureaucratic alternative to government provision,
which in turn permits greater diversity of ideas. Schizer, supra note 15, at 228, 243-44.
44. See Simon, supra note 43, at 254-55.
45. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513-14 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 288-89 (2000) [hereinafter PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE]; ROBERT D. PUTNAM WITH ROBERT LEONARDI & RAFFAELLA Y. NANETTI,
MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 89-90 (1993); Benshalom,
supra note 31, at 1077-79; Simon, supra note 43, at 254-57.
46. See ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 133 (1956); MICHAEL WALZER,
ON TOLERATION 107 (1997); Brennen, supra note 43, at 24.
47. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 45, at 288-89; Jürgen Habermas, Justice and
Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning “Stage 6”, in HERMENEUTICS AND CRITICAL THEORY
IN ETHICS AND POLITICS 32, 44-45 (Michael Kelly ed., 1990); Kathleen Sullivan, Rainbow
Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1719-21 (1988).
48. See PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF
MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 2-3 (1977).
49. Levmore, supra note 15, at 404-06.
50. Anthony B. Atkinson, The Income Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, in
PUBLIC AND URBAN ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WILLIAM S. VICKEY 13, 13 (Ronald E.
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offered arguments for why there should be some additional benefits
for redistributive charity, they have not explained why the deduc-
tion should be withdrawn from other goals, such as research,
teaching, or art. Thus, I do not view redistribution as a comprehen-
sive theory of the deduction, but instead only as an additional
benefit that might be wrung from it. 
II. INADEQUACY OF CURRENT THEORIES OF THE DEDUCTION
Though the subsidy theories of the deduction now are dominant,
they have papered over a sizable hole in their rationales. Market
failures explain why there must be a government intervention, but
they do not explain why that intervention should be in the form of
a subsidy for charity, rather than direct government provision of the
goods the market fails to offer. Some of the subsidy theorists, such
as Henry Hansmann, have been candid in admitting that they can
offer no clear reason to prefer charity to government.51 Others,
however, maintain that government fails to satisfy minority
preferences or that government provision alone would not be
sufficiently diverse or pluralistic.52 As I will show in this Part, these
claims fail to account adequately for the governance possibilities
federalism offers. Parts II.A through II.D sketch out flaws in the
prevailing approaches, and Part II.E summarizes what remains of
the argument for subsidized charity after these limitations are
accounted for. 
A. Government Failure and Multiple Jurisdictions
Burton Weisbrod’s median voter theory is by far the most common
explanation for why there should be a charitable subsidy in addition
to governmental provision of public goods.53 According to Weisbrod,
Grieson ed., 1976); Perry Fleischer, supra note 29, at 509-11; Oliver A. Houck, With Charity
for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1423 (1984). But see Strnad, supra note 28, at 283 (arguing that
charity is a poor mechanism for redistribution).
51. Hansmann, supra note 2, at 896.
52. See supra note 43.
53. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 2, at 100-08; Atkinson, supra note 1, at 576-77; John D.
Colombo, The Role of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 343, 366 (2004);
Crimm, supra note 1, at 442 & n.91; Perry Fleischer, supra note 29, at 520; Gergen, supra
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governmental provision of public goods by majority rule will disap-
point some minority voters, assuming that voters vary in their
preferences.54 In Weisbrod’s model, officials behave according to the
standard political science assumption that they should enact the
preferences of the median voter.55 Government succeeds in providing
public goods where the median voter is willing to pay for at least
some of a given good, because government can tax would-be free
riders. But the median voter will not reelect an official who imposes
a tax for more goods than she prefers to pay for. Voters who would
demand even more of the good therefore cannot use the govern-
ment’s taxing power to overcome the free rider problem.56 As a
result, just as in the private market, democratic government fails to
meet all of society’s preferences for the consumption of public goods.
Subsidies for charity thus allow voters who want more of the good
to surmount the free rider barrier.57 
1. Tiebout and Inframarginal Donors
One glaring problem with this account, albeit one almost totally
absent from the nonprofit literature, is that it assumes that disap-
pointed voters who prefer more services have no choice of govern-
ments with taxing authority.58 But in a competing model, first
suggested by the economist Charles Tiebout voters have a choice
between many rival local governments.59 Thus, rather than having
note 1, at 1399; Kingma, supra note 14, at 135; Strnad, supra note 28, at 285; Avner Ben-Ner,
Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector? Reforming Law and Public Policy Towards Nonprofit
Organizations, 104 YALE L.J. 731, 749 & n.84 (1994) (reviewing WHO BENEFITS FROM THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR? (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992)).
54. Weisbrod, supra note 12, at 175-77.
55. Id. at 176. In the simplified two-party universe of the median voter model, rational
officials obey the median voter because appealing to anyone else means losing the next
election. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 89. 
56. As Weisbrod notes, this account assumes that taxes are a “nonbenefit”—that is, that
each voter cannot individually choose the exact level of tax she pays and benefit she receives,
as might be the case with a system of tolls or user fees. Weisbrod, supra note 12, at 175.
57. Id. at 188-89; see also Strnad, supra note 28, at 270-72 (describing charities as a
mechanism for revealing preferences for public goods not expressed through government or
private market). But see id. at 285 (suggesting that add-on theory fails if government reduces
its own expenditures in response to charitable spending).
58. Weisbrod, supra note 12, at 178.
59. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418
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to rely on subsidies, a voter who preferred more services than her
local median voter would simply move to a jurisdiction where the
median preference was closer to her own. The reverse would be true
for voters with submedian preferences: they would move to a
jurisdiction that imposed a lower tax. At equilibrium, assuming that
there were enough jurisdictions to choose from and moving were
costless, voters in each jurisdiction would actually have identical
preferences for public goods, negating the basic assumption of
Weisbrod’s model.60 
Weisbrod acknowledges that voter mobility is a challenge for his
argument, but dismisses it in one sentence. “[S]ince moving is not
costless,” he avers, “and since locational decisions reflect many
considerations other than governmental outputs and taxes, we can
think of [the model] as portray[ing] ... the likely [type of] situation
even after migration adjustments.”61 That is, the claim appears to
be that citizens will not sort themselves perfectly according to their
preferences, so that there will always be some residual, unmet
demand for public goods, even at the local level.62 
While Weisbrod is correct that the “market” for local government
is imperfect, he fails to recognize that in a federal system, subsidies
for charity contribute to two other inefficiencies. First, any signifi-
cant amount of mobility increases the waste inherent in the subsidy
and reduces its cost-effectiveness. Like most subsidy systems, the
charitable contribution deduction is wasteful because it gives money
even to donors who would have contributed without encourage-
ment—“inframarginal” donors.63 For example, consumers with the
(1956). For elaborations, see Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy
of Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 73, 83-85 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997);
Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 1124 (1999)
[hereinafter Oates, Fiscal Federalism]; Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout
Model, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 93, 93, 95-97 (1981). 
60. Weisbrod, supra note 12, at 175.
61. Id. at 178. 
62. Empirical measures of Tiebout sorting are mixed, but in general they find that at the
margins people do respond to their local mix of taxes and government services. For empirical
surveys, see Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 520-22 (1991); William W.
Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition:
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 239-43 (1997); Richard
Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1830 (2003) (book review). 
63. See Schizer, supra note 15, at 239-40.
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highest demand for a public good cannot free ride on anyone else,
and so will buy at least some of the good without subsidization.64
But they, too, can claim the deduction, meaning that the govern-
ment spends more on high-demand consumers without obtaining
more of the good.65 By definition, top demanders spend more and get
a bigger matching grant than anyone else. Moreover, donors have
no incentive to turn down unneeded subsidies, because the fiscal
cost of subsidies is largely an externality for any one person: only a
tiny fraction of the tax dollars needed to pay for the subsidy comes
from his pocket. Thus, unless government can set a different sub-
sidy rate for each donor, which is unlikely,66 a portion of the subsidy
claimed by inframarginal donors is wasted.
Mobility exacerbates the waste problem in two different ways. For
one, the possibility of relocation implies that donors could obtain the
services they want without a subsidy. That is, as long as there exists
another jurisdiction offering additional units of the good, and the
cost of moving is less than the cost to the donor of paying for new
units of that good in her home jurisdiction, the donor can be
satisfied without any subsidy simply by moving. Moving does
eliminate the externalities that additional units of the good would
produce in the home jurisdiction, but, as I later detail, it is unclear
whether that is a bad result. 
Relocation also heightens inframarginality by increasing the
proportion of inframarginal donors in the donor pool. Again, those
with the highest demand for a good in any given jurisdiction are
almost always inframarginal. Each person who moves to obtain
more of the good elsewhere reduces the number of potential donors
who fall in between median demand and highest demand.67 But
64. Peter Diamond, Optimal Tax Treatment of Private Contributions for Public Goods with
and Without Warm Glow Preferences, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 897, 898 (2006). The income effects of
a deduction may increase donations even by inframarginal donors, however.
65. MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40919, AN
OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND CHARITABLE SECTOR 49 (2009), available at http://pppnet.
org/pdf/R40919.pdf.
66. See Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. PUB. ECON. 469, 471-72 (1995)
(explaining that if subsidy is determined by observed donor behavior, donors may act
strategically to increase subsidy). 
67. This is true even if the highest demanders leave, because once they depart, the next-
highest demander becomes the new highest demander. Also, note that the mobility I focus on
here is not random relocation but instead moves by those who desire more of the good. This
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these are the donors for whom a subsidy is useful, so that mobility
reduces the proportion of deductions claimed by people who will
increase giving as a result. If Tiebout sorting were extensive
enough, there could be no supermedian voters in a jurisdiction
except for the top demanders. 
So Weisbrod’s argument that there will always be residual
demand for a public good misses the point. Demand may remain,
but the need for a subsidy might not. Even if some whose giving
would be increased by subsidies do not move, a significant portion
of each dollar spent on the subsidy could be wasted. 
2. Distortionary Effects of Subsidized Charity in Federal  
Systems
A second inefficiency of the subsidy in a multijurisdictional world
arises if it distorts donors’ choices of where to live or do business. Of
course, the subsidy is supposed to change behavior: it encourages us
to give to charity rather than free ride. But this traditional analysis
overlooks that there are actually three options, not two: (1) do
nothing; (2) give to charity; or (3) move to a jurisdiction where more
goods are produced. While the shift from (1) to (2) may be socially
desirable, the deduction also induces a shift from (3) to (2). That
shift may reduce welfare. 
As I model more formally elsewhere,68 shifts from (3) to (2) reduce
welfare when moving is better for society than forming another
charity. In addition to generating positive externalities, charities
can also produce negative externalities, including the tax cost of
subsidizing them.69 Some of these externalities would disappear if
the would-be consumer of the charitable good relocates to a
jurisdiction where that good is already being produced rather than
founding a new organization in her existing home. The deduction
reduces the appeal of relocation for the consumer, though, which
form of relocation disproportionately reduces the number of supermedian voters without
changing the number of others, which is why the usefulness of the charitable subsidy declines. 
68. Brian Galle, The Distortionary Effects of Subsidies for Charity in a Federal System
(Bos. Coll. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 229, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1865975.
69. Benshalom, supra note 31, at 1073-74.
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means that in some cases welfare-increasing relocations will not
happen. 
The idea that charity can produce negative as well as positive
externalities is not new. Louis Kaplow argues that charity might
reduce incentives for individuals to work, thus slowing the econ-
omy.70 For example, redistributive charities, such as soup kitchens
and free health care, make it less painful to have a lower income.71
More generally, any government subsidy imposes a negative fiscal
externality on taxpayers who value the benefits of the subsidized
charity less than their payment. Shannon McCormack also notes
that individuals can have personal or ideological objections to the
production of some public goods.72
I would add to Kaplow’s and McCormack’s accounts by noting
that, crucially, negative externalities that would arise if the good
were produced in one jurisdiction may not arise at all if the good
were instead produced in another. Consider a homeless shelter,
which might give material succor or emotional satisfaction to some,
but also annoy NIMBY-minded neighbors. Those who view a town
with an additional shelter as fairer might be willing to, but prefer
not to, move in order to effect justice. If they relocated to a like-
minded town, those who objected would no longer suffer the
disutility of living near a shelter. But the shelter-builders have no
reason to depart; they do not bear any of the unhappiness of their
neighbors. 
More prosaically, suppose that the median voter, after applying
cost-benefit analysis, determines that the current level of wildlife-
protection enforcement is optimal; any greater amounts, she deems,
will not be worth the cost of deterring possible business invest-
ments. Now suppose some citizens place a higher value on addi-
tional increments of wildlife protection and form a “save the whales”
charity to identify and picket offending local business. Even if
damage to business is small, the cost of supporting the wildlife
charity may exceed any subjective gains for those who love animals
70. LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 253-54, 271-72
(2008).
71. Id. at 254-55 & n.13.
72. Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good with the Bad: Recognizing the Negative
Externalities Created by Charities and Their Implications for the Charitable Deduction, 52
ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 998, 1010-11 (2010).
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less. Here again, the ideal result in terms of social welfare would be
for those who favor greater wildlife protection to relocate to a region
with more stringent wildlife-protection laws. Because they are
indifferent to the negative effects of their charitable works on other
voters, however, they do not go.
Subsidies for charity exacerbate these potential negative effects
by discouraging individuals from relocating. All else equal, a person
will move when the costs of relocation are lower than the costs of
paying for charitable production of a good in her existing
hometown.73 Subsidies for charity make charity relatively cheaper,
reducing the appeal of a move. The larger the subsidy, the less likely
an individual will relocate, as Figure 1 suggests. 
73. I emphasize “all else equal.” My analysis here is intended as a partial equilibrium, in
which I isolate the interaction of two parts of a complex federalism mechanism. It is possible
that this interaction would prompt yet other, and potentially offsetting, reactions by other
actors. Even if so, these counterreactions may themselves represent costs that would not be
incurred but for the deduction.
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In the absence of a subsidy, an individual i relocates when her
moving costs intersect the marginal cost line, at A, which corre-
sponds to point C on her marginal utility curve, well before equilib-
rium. In the presence of the subsidy, however, the moving cost curve
does not intersect marginal cost until point B, corresponding to
point D on the marginal utility curve, well past the original,
unsubsidized equilibrium. So subsidies shift the moving point, in
effect increasing the amount of the public good produced in the
home jurisdiction. 
 Figure 1: Effects of Charitable Subsidies on Moving Decisions 
A
C
B
D
Discounted Marginal Cost Moving Cost Marginal UtilityMarginal Cost 
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This change is the key distortive effect of the subsidy, as illus-
trated in Figure 2. 
In Figure 2, social surplus from production of the good is repre-
sented by the rough triangle formed by the marginal utility and net
social cost curves, with its vertex at point B and extending left to the
y-axis; social loss from excess production of the good is represented
by the triangle BAH. In the absence of a subsidy, i moves when her
marginal utility is at F, where moving costs intersect her marginal
cost curve. Because she moves, no additional units of the good are
produced in jurisdiction one, resulting in the loss of the surplus
represented by the triangle BFJ. But the relocation also prevents i
from consuming the incremental units between B and A on her
marginal utility curve, avoiding the social overproduction, with
welfare consequences represented by the similarly sized triangle
BAH. So on net, the welfare effects of the move are unclear. In
 Figure 2: Net Welfare Effects of Charitable Subsidies
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2012] THE ROLE OF CHARITY IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 799
contrast, under a subsidy, i does not relocate until her marginal
utility reaches G, the point on her marginal utility curve directly
above the point at which moving and discounted marginal costs are
equal. This permits additional overproduction, resulting in the loss
triangle BGI. That triangle is obviously much larger than the
surplus BFJ, so on net the subsidy is clearly welfare-reducing: it has
permitted more losses than gains. 
More generally, the welfare effects of a subsidy depend on the
consequences of a rightward shift in the region affected by a move.
If the line running upwards from point E, the moving point under
a subsidy, intersects the marginal utility curve in a region where
there is still net social surplus, then the subsidy increases welfare:
it allows additional production of welfare-increasing public goods.
If instead (as in Figure 2) point E corresponds to a region in which
social welfare is decreasing, then the subsidy is likely to reduce
welfare: it allows additional production of welfare-reducing public
goods. This effect may be counterbalanced by any surplus that was
also created as a result of the rightward shift. 
Put more simply, subsidies for charity may well reduce national
welfare. Where the welfare from a person’s decision to stay is
negative, society would be better off if she moved. But the subsidy
discourages her from moving, and the larger the subsidy, the more
likely she will stay. 
One final consideration to keep in mind is that public goods that
create significant externalities for other jurisdictions may be
impossible to obtain by moving. Municipalities might underproduce
many public goods benefitting a wide geographical area, because
each individual town has incentives to free ride on others’ efforts.74
It would be surprising, for example, to see one city try to save the
world’s whales.75 The deduction is less likely to reduce social welfare
for these kinds of national-scope projects, because charities are less
likely to have any subnational government competition. So, in that
scenario, the world looks more like Weisbrod’s model in which there
74. Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519,
1554 (1982). Whether localities in fact free ride on production of any particular public goods
with interjurisdictional spillovers is a complex and difficult question. See Brian Galle &
Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments,
58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1341-98 (2009). 
75. I am grateful to Louis Kaplow for this point. 
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are only two possible sources of a public good: government and
charity. 
Taking all these factors into account, some justification for a
charitable deduction remains, but it is rather more limited than
Weisbrod, and those who rely on him, suggest. Charity has benefits,
but also countervailing costs. All else being equal, subsidies for
charity are efficient not simply when there are some citizens with
preferences different from the median voter, but rather only when
the social cost of relocation exceeds the social cost of charity,
including the cost of raising taxes to provide the subsidy. Thus,
there is a significant possibility that granting the deduction will
reduce overall social welfare. 
B. Government Failure and Multiple Tiers of Government
Another factor limiting the usefulness of the charitable deduction
under Weisbrod’s government-failure model is the possibility of
vertical competition between tiers of government. Again, Weisbrod
defends his assumption that even multiple governments will leave
some voters unhappy with the low level of public goods by suggest-
ing that voters cannot easily move to a rival jurisdiction.76 Thus, he
claims that there will always be some additional policy-making
space to be filled by a subsidy for charity.77 
This account assumes that voters must actually move in order to
obtain services from a different government. But in a multitiered
government, such as the U.S. system of federalism, there is policy
competition not only horizontally between local governments but
also vertically, between local governments, states, and the national
government.78 In other words, even if the median voter at the
national level has preferences that are too low for some voters, it
may be the case that the median voter at the state or local level
would prefer more services, or vice versa. In some cases there can
be multiple tiers of local government. A single voter could be within
76. Weisbrod, supra note 12, at 178.
77. Id.
78. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999); Akhil
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1449-50 (1987) (citing THE
FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 294 (James Madison)); Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s
Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 338-53 (2003).
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a county, a municipality, and one or more “special-purpose” govern-
ments such as school or water districts.79 All of these represent
opportunities to get more public goods than the nation or state pro-
vides without incurring any moving costs at all. 
As with relocation, Weisbrod considers this possibility but
dismisses it out of hand.80 I concede that there are some plausible
arguments that special-purpose governments may fail to maximize
social welfare. But the story is more nuanced, and leaves less room
for charity, than Weisbrod suggests. 
Weisbrod argues that it is costly to establish new governmental
entities, so that there may be practical limitations on the citizenry’s
ability to create additional layers of government in response to
added demands for public goods.81 Yet it is also costly to establish
charitable organizations. It is unclear why we should prefer a
subsidized charitable organization to a special-purpose governmen-
tal entity. Financing cannot be the answer, because we could easily
design the special-purpose government to operate on subsidized
user fees, which would be largely identical to the charitable funding
model.82 
Nonetheless, I agree that even endless tiers of special-purpose
governments could fail to account for all preferences. One possible
“failure” story along these lines is that special-purpose governments
are not practical for some kinds of public goods. “Save-the-whales”
organizations and their kin—entities with missions that could
benefit the whole country—are likely examples here. Where benefits
are widely dispersed, only very high demanders of the good are
likely to contribute to its production.83 Because any special-purpose
government would have to be drawn to include mostly those who
favor production of the good, the district’s borders would have to
79. On the various forms of special-purpose districts, see Richard Briffault, A Government
for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365,
377-413 (1999); Janice C. Griffith, Special Tax Districts To Finance Residential Infrastructure,
39 URB. LAW. 959, 959-72 (2007).
80. Weisbrod, supra note 12, at 178.
81. Id.
82. See Krashinsky, supra note 14, at 125 (offering user fees as fiscal equivalent of
charitable contributions).
83. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 608 (1980). Again, this is because all others would simply
free ride on the efforts of those with the strongest preferences. Id.
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match the geographic distribution of those who favor production.
Yet it is likely prohibitively difficult to gerrymander a special save-
the-whales district across, say, seven coastal states. Charity might
be a more viable mechanism for bringing together supporters. 
Another possible failure story is that increasing the number of
layers of local government lowers the desirability of any further
proliferation. Voters are usually fairly inattentive to political deci-
sions, because they rationally free ride on the efforts of others to
monitor government.84 A thicket of local governments would likely
add considerably to the costs of monitoring, compounding the ra-
tional ignorance problem.85 This, in turn, poses the danger that
some politicians could either escape accountability or instead be
blamed for the misdeeds of others inside the thicket.86 Adding extra
layers of government could reduce the quality not only of the added
special-purpose unit but also of government more generally. That
would leave us with a trade-off between the welfare gained by
satisfying supra-median voters and the welfare lost by muddying
government. 
Finally, there may be some policy that cannot costlessly be shifted
between different levels of government. The choice of where to locate
regulatory authority within a federated system involves a series of
trade-offs.87 Some policies may have either economies or disecono-
mies of scale; that is, they are cheaper or more expensive, respec-
tively, to operate for larger groups of people.88 And bundles of
policies can have economies of scope, in which it is more efficient to
have the same group of experts work on several related problems
simultaneously.89 In short, at times there is already an optimal level
84. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 240-59 (1957); see Stephen
Earl Bennett, Trends in Americans’ Political Information, 1967-1987, 17 AM. POL. Q. 422, 423
(1989) (finding that voter knowledge was consistently low for the twenty years studied).
85. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 MICH. L. REV. 277,
296-97 (2007).
86. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992); see Ernest A. Young, Two
Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1360-69 (2001) (making this argument
about joint federal-state projects).
87. See Oates, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 59, at 1120.
88. See Alberto Alesina et al., What Does the European Union Do?, 123 PUB. CHOICE 275,
276 (2005); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11 J. ECON.
PERSP. 43, 45-46 (1997).
89. See FRANCESCO PARISI & VINCY FON, THE ECONOMICS OF LAWMAKING 51-54 (2009).
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of government for producing a particular public good, so that
redirecting some of its production to another level requires sacrific-
ing the benefits of its initial location. 
Overall, the opportunity to choose between multiple layers of
government thus appears to further narrow, but not to eliminate, a
role for charitable subsidies. In some cases, voters can get the extra
services they want just by asking for them from a different level of
government. 
C. Government Failure and Public Choice
Another fundamental problem of Weisbrod’s government-failure
theory is that it is premised on the idea that officials will meet the
preferences of the electorate’s median voter.90 Public choice theory91
teaches, however, that officials are motivated not merely by votes
but also by other rewards that they can collect from interest
groups.92 Even purely public-minded elected officials lack perfect
information about voters’ preferences—indeed, those preferences
may be unsettled in the minds of voters.93 Nonetheless, the average
voter will prefer to free ride on the efforts of others in offering
rewards or information to politicians.94 As a result, political out-
comes depend more on intensity of preferences than on their raw
numbers.95 Voters who have limited opportunities to free ride—
those who are few in number or feel especially strongly about their
positions—will be able to command disproportionate influence on
government.96 
90. See Weisbrod, supra note 12, at 175-76.
91. For overviews, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); DANIEL A. FARBER
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
92. FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND
POLITICAL EXTORTION, at x (1997).
93. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 20-21, 31, 35 (1971). 
94. Id. at 34-35.
95. Id. at 35.
96. Barry R. Weingast et al., The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical
Approach to Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642, 649 (1981).
804 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:777
1. The Public Choice Critique
Public choice theory predicts that Weisbrod’s public-goods short-
fall can be filled not by subsidized charity but instead simply by
lobbying.97 Voters with the strongest preferences for public goods
will, by definition, comprise a coalition of less than half the elec-
torate, and possibly much less. And, again by definition, these
interests will have stronger-than-average preferences. Thus, in a
typical legislative contest between those who prefer the median
amount of a public good and those who prefer more, those who
prefer more should prevail. The only cost to those who prefer less of
the good is a tax increase. But this tax increase is distributed across
the entire population, while the benefits of the additional spending
are concentrated among the high-demanders. So in the lobbying
contest that ensues, the opposition is rather more likely to free ride
on one another than the spending supporters, leading to spending
on projects that command only minority support. Thus, a “save-the-
whales” charity could acquire federal funding without a subsidy,
because whale lovers will lobby intensely while other voters are
fairly inattentive to the costs. This point about the tragedy of the
budget commons is familiar in other contexts, but it has not
generally been applied to the need for a charitable deduction.98 
Mixed goods, such as those provided by schools and universities,
are especially apt to benefit from public choice factors. The mixed
good is private but provides a positive externality to others.
Lobbying for private goods is more intense because, by definition,
the group of beneficiaries is limited.99 So even if no one would lobby
for education generally at the national level, local activists who
would benefit from aid to their university will all push for targeted
funds, resulting in more education overall. 
97. Kingma, supra note 14, at 145; Krashinsky, supra note 14, at 124-25; cf. Levmore,
supra note 15, at 404 n.54 (claiming that the pluralist argument for deduction fails to take
account of public choice theory).
98. E.g., Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial
Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 465-66 (2002);
Weingast et al., supra note 96, at 648-49.
99. OLSON, supra note 93, at 132-33.
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2. Exceptions to the Critique
As with my other critiques of Weisbrod’s argument, the public-
choice approach still admits of some role for charitable organ-
izations, but on a somewhat different basis than has been recog-
nized by others. In some cases, lobbying is likely to fail. Where the
extra service is controversial or ideologically charged, there may be
an energized and concentrated interest group opposed to its public
provision. Even when there is no opposition, those who prefer more
services may have comparatively scarce resources to expend on
lobbying.100 Each of these scenarios arguably imply some role for
charitable supplements to government spending. For example, a
homeless shelter might face tough opposition from NIMBY neigh-
bors, and supporters may be relatively poor. As a result, lobbying for
a new shelter might be futile, leaving charity as the more viable
option.
In similar fashion, the nonprofit sector might be a meaningful ad-
dition to government when public choice factors suppress spending
below the level preferred by the median voter. To take one familiar
example, in a progressive tax system, a disproportionate share of
the government’s budget is borne by the wealthy.101 Where wealthy
voters perceive themselves as receiving little benefit from some pro-
grams, such as transfer payments or other forms of social insurance,
they are capable of and likely to block such programs, even if most
voters would have voted in favor of them.102 This is the scenario
envisioned by a number of commentators, who have argued that
charities are useful mostly as a vehicle for wealth redistribution.103 
Lastly, subsidizing charity may be more efficient than lobbying
because it requires a smaller subsidy to induce some entrepreneurs
100. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1277, 1327-28 (1993) (arguing that voting power does not necessarily overcome other
impediments to political power for the poor, such as lack of resources and difficulty
organizing).
101. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 523 (2d ed. 2007). That is,
there is a strong correlation between annual income and total wealth. Martin J. McMahon,
Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1012-21 (2004).
102. Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the
Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 518-19 (1998).
103. See sources cited supra note 50.
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to provide it.104 Lobbying requires entrepreneurs to divide “rents,”
or the rewards from producing public goods, between themselves
and politicians, while charity might allow the entrepreneur to keep
all of it.105 Existing legal rules, such as the number of seats in the
legislature, make officials’ time and attention scarce resources.106
Competing lobbying efforts to get on the agenda bid up the price of
rents needed to secure government action.107 In contrast, the pool of
policy entrepreneurs is not likely to be as limited; entrepreneurs
will enter the field as long as there are rents available.108 This
condition will bid down the rent premium needed to attract
charitable entrepreneurs. 
Overall, public choice theory undermines Weisbrod’s claims but
does suggest that lobbying will leave some gaps. As a result, some
controversial or redistributive organizations, such as homeless
shelters, remain likely candidates for the deduction. Additionally,
to the extent that charity is more efficient, charities might be
preferable to lobbying, even if lobbying were likely to succeed. 
104. Cf. Krashinsky, supra note 14, at 124-25 (suggesting that obtaining public good
through charity is preferable to government if transaction costs of forming the nonprofit are
lower than lobbying). For descriptions of the role of “entrepreneurs” in mobilizing political
groups, see Christopher Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment—
Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29, 49-56 (1998);
Richard Wagner, Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs: A Review Article, 1 PAPERS ON
NON-MARKET DECISION MAKING 161, 161-70 (1966) (reviewing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965)).
105. See Fred McChesney, Rent Extraction and Interest Group Organization in a Coasean
Model of Regulation, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 84-89 (1991) (claiming that politicians can better
extract value from highly organized groups, leading to lower overall returns from political
organizing). Or, similarly, it might be argued that nonprofit organizations have self-serving
internal institutional goals that may conflict with the stakeholders’ policy preferences, so that
lobbying by those organizations results in some diversion of effort to these ego rents rather
than the group’s mission. See Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political
Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV.
845, 875-78 (1999) (arguing that environmental advocacy groups choose to lobby for
enforcement mechanisms that will increase their own “prominence” rather than those that
are maximally effective at reducing pollution). 
106. See Krashinsky, supra note 14, at 125; Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political
Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 111 n.464 (1994). A similar
phenomenon occurs when political actors are limited by budget constraints. Nancy C. Staudt,
Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1132-33.
107. See Krashinsky, supra note 14, at 125.
108. See James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357,
370-71 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (describing how available political rents attract
entrepreneurs). 
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D. Other Rationales for Deduction
Like Weisbrod’s explanation for charity, other theories of the
charitable deduction struggle to account for federalism and public
choice theory. These other rationales vary in the ultimate goals they
ascribe to charity, but they each depend on the existence of policy
alternatives to majoritarian government. Most obviously, both
pluralism and diversity call for opportunities for new, unpopular, or
otherwise unusual views occasionally to produce not just talk but
also policy results.109 
These theories could be satisfied as easily by multiple govern-
ments as by charity. Local governments with some degree of inde-
pendence from the central government can give voice to diverse
interests and offer a plurality of views, each of which then has
potential to bubble up more widely across the nation. These points
are worth explaining in more detail. 
1. Federalism
The diversity and pluralism arguments are even more vulnerable
than Weisbrod’s theory to the federalism objection because they do
not require that every jurisdiction offer a full array of policy options.
Weisbrod could argue that limitations on relocation leave open a
space for charity, because his premise is that citizens in each
locality might want additional public goods.110 But society can be
diverse or pluralistic overall, even if some regions are not. 
To review, the diversity and pluralism rationales argue that
society is better off when some policy outcomes are the result of
many different voices and interests. Part of this gain is to society
overall: gains from experiments, innovation, and diversification of
risk. Another benefit is to individuals, in that their participation in
policymaking helps them develop as persons.111 
Federalism, too, can offer both of these benefits. Given many
competing localities, it is likely that at least some of them will, by
chance, have a majority willing to enact any given good, ensuring
109. See sources cited supra note 43.
110. Weisbrod, supra note 12, at 178.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
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some degree of national diversity. The fact that some citizens face
barriers to moving does not matter: as long as each policy option can
be produced somewhere, the nation as a whole can still reap the
benefits of local experiments.112 On the participation side, towns and
special-purpose governments, like charities, offer a chance for small-
scale, intimate roles in policymaking.113 
2. Public Choice
Public choice theory casts one final cloud over the alternatives to
Weisbrod. As we have seen, minority views will often be better
equipped to garner political support than others.114 Thus, while
pluralism and diversity are themselves public goods, such that we
should expect few to lobby for them in the abstract, there may often
be strong proponents in favor of specific deviations from the
majority’s preferences. 
This dynamic is especially powerful in combination with federal-
ism. Local officials may calculate that those who hold nonstandard
preferences for public goods would be willing to deliver political
rents in exchange for receiving those goods, particularly if they
cannot obtain those goods anywhere else.115 To obtain the rents, the
official might offer financial or other incentives to help overcome
barriers to relocation.116 These incentives cost tax dollars, but that
expense can be passed on to all the residents of the jurisdiction, who
might well free ride on one another’s efforts to resist.117 Local
112. Governments can usually copy policies that succeed elsewhere easily. Galle & Leahy,
supra note 74, at 1347-60.
113. See Lehavi, supra note 37, at 4-6 (arguing for this role for local governments).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
115. Cf. Lynn Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911,
1971 & n.279 (1995) (arguing that voters place very high value on a policy choice where few
other jurisdictions would offer it).
116. Cf. Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It To Do So,
78 IND. L.J. 459, 473-74 (2003) (arguing that policies appealing to minority populations may
be a competitive tool for states attempting to attract migrants); John O. McGinnis & Ilya
Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99
NW. U. L. REV. 89, 108-09 (2004) (suggesting that state officials compete for migrants in order
to build influence with powerful local constituencies).
117. See DOWNS, supra note 84, at 244-45.
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officials may therefore move toward diversity as a strategy for
attracting political support.118 
E. An Overview So Far
Given the complex set of overlapping arguments and counter-
arguments I have laid out so far, it is helpful to pause to summarize
what remains of the traditional explanations for subsidized charity.
Both Weisbrod and proponents of the diversity theories offer
important insights, but on closer examination, their claims are
subject to major qualifications. The qualifications are nuanced, so
that the strength of each critique is weaker or stronger depending
on the nature of the particular public good that is to be subsidized.
What is true for soup kitchens is not clearly true for universities or
efforts to save the whales. How do these nuances relate to one
another? 
To simplify the analysis, my qualms about the traditional expla-
nations can be boiled down to four basic questions or considerations.
First, are the positive externalities from production of the good
primarily local, or do they instead spread across many jurisdictions?
Nationwide spillovers strengthen the case for subsidies, because
they are likely to result in free riding by any one government. They
would also be difficult to produce by drawing a special-purpose
government. 
The second and third factors depend on the political concentration
of the benefits and burdens of the good. These are both basic public
choice issues: if a good produces large, concentrated benefits, it is
more likely that lobbying could convince officials to produce the good
without the need for charity. That is especially true of private goods
with a positive externality attached to them. On the flip side, goods
that burden or annoy a small portion of the population—especially
a portion that is already politically powerful—in a significant way
are less likely to succeed, even if the median voter prefers them.
Fourth, does the public good in question create negative externali-
ties that are localized, in the sense that they could be reduced or
eliminated if production of the good were moved somewhere else? If
118. Cf. Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 912-18 (2008)
(describing incentives for officials to adopt policies at variance with the federal government’s).
810 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:777
so, I have argued, there is a strong possibility that the deduction is
inefficient.119 If not, there is still a chance the deduction inefficiently
distorts interjurisdictional mobility, but it is less likely. 
As a very rough first cut on what remains of the argument for
subsidized charity, then, I simply plot these factors together side by
side, in Table 1. 
Form Geog. Scope of
Positive Exter-
nalities
(S)
Political 
Concentration
of Benefits
(B)
Political 
Concentration
of Costs
(C)
Geog. Scope
of Negative
Externalities
(E)
Case for
Subsidy
Local

Nat’l

Conc.

Diffuse

Conc.

Diffuse

Local

Nat’l

1 Local Conc. Conc. Local weak
2 Local Conc. Conc. Nat’l neutral
3 Local Conc. Diffuse Local v. weak
4 Local Conc. Diffuse Nat’l weak
5 Local Diffuse Conc. Local neutral
6 Local Diffuse Conc. Nat’l strong
7 Local Diffuse Diffuse Local weak
8 Local Diffuse Diffuse Nat’l neutral
9 Nat’l Conc. Conc. Local neutral
10 Nat’l Conc. Conc. Nat’l strong
11 Nat’l Conc. Diffuse Local weak
12 Nat’l Conc. Diffuse Nat’l weak
13 Nat’l Diffuse Conc. Local strong
14 Nat’l Diffuse Conc. Nat’l strong
15 Nat’l Diffuse Diffuse Local neutral
16 Nat’l Diffuse Diffuse Nat’l strong
Table 1: Combinations of Factors Affecting the Strength of the Argument
for a Subsidy
Each factor either strengthens (), weakens (), or has no or an
uncertain effect () on the argument for charity. The final right-
hand column sums the various factors in each row. In summing
these factors, I assume that political concentration of benefits (B) is
119. See supra Part II.A.2. Again, these negative externalities can include the tax costs of
the subsidy. However, because it is difficult to predict in the abstract when those costs would
exceed an individual taxpayer’s demand for the charity, I focus here on other forms of negative
externality.
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somewhat more important than geographical scope of positive
externalities (S) on the theory that the political rents from pleasing
an activated constituency would overcome any local government
inclinations to free ride. “Neutral” results indicate that my analysis
does not suggest a different outcome from Weisbrod’s, except to the
extent that the waste and geographical distortion of the deduction
might reduce welfare even where negative externalities are not
localized. “Weak” indicates that the case for charity is weaker than
under traditional theories; “strong” indicates the opposite. 
Table 2 summarizes these results and offers real-world examples
of public goods that correspond to each of the sixteen resulting
combinations.
Form Factors Examples Case for Subsidy
1 SL,BC,CC,EL Opera; Shakespeare in the Park weak
2 SL,BC,CC,EN Offensive art; political theater neutral
3 SL,BC,CD,EL Fair-housing enforcement weak
4 SL,BC,CD,EN Parks; museums weak
5 SL,BD,CC,EL Homeless shelters neutral
6 SL,BD,CC,EN Local consumer protection enforcement/ 
better business bureaus
strong
7 SL,BD,CD,EL Mass transit; fireworks weak
8 SL,BD,CD,EN Emergency rooms weak
9 SN,BC,CC,EL Wind farms neutral
10 SN,BC,CC,EN Endangered species conservation strong
11 SL,BC,CD,EL Wetlands preservation weak
12 SL,BC,CD,EN Universities weak
13 SN,BD,CC,EL Nuclear waste storage strong
14 SN,BD,CC,EN Clean air strong
15 SN,BD,CD,EL “Star Wars” missile defense neutral
16 SN,BD,CC,EN Salvation Army; public health strong
Table 2: Summary of case for subsidy for representative public goods
Although the results here are only a very rough approximation,
they nonetheless are striking. Hospitals, universities, and museums
are among the largest of existing charities, and their eligibility for
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charitable status under existing law is largely unquestioned.120 Yet
the case for subsidies for all three are remarkably weak under my
reappraisal of the traditional rationales. For example, although the
nationwide public good of a well-educated populace might be subject
to free riding among states, universities provide a private good to
enrollees, such that we would expect that lobbying could often
produce significant expenditures on higher education. Thus, the gap
between median and high-demanding voters suggested by Weisbrod
is unlikely to arise. 
A number of other charitable forms score as “neutral,” but that
should not be read as an unqualified endorsement of the traditional
analysis. For nearly all of the “neutrals,” factors that cut against
subsidy are balanced against those that favor it. Whether subsidies
are appropriate should depend on a more careful analysis of which
factors loom larger for a particular good. For instance, homeless
shelters might produce relatively concentrated negative externali-
ties among nearby residents unhappy about the effects of the shelter
on their neighborhood, which would depress political support and
increase the case for charitable production. But at the same time,
the negative externality might be eliminated if shelter donors would
instead relocate. We do not know whether the welfare losses from
that distortion exceed the gains from spurring more charitable as-
sistance for the poor. Consequently, organizations in the “neutral”
category are not necessarily good candidates for subsidy.121 
As a result, to this point it appears that the argument that
charity fills in where government cannot has been oversold. There
are a handful of situations where some level of government will
likely fail to provide all of the public goods the population demands
and charitable provision will increase social welfare. But these few
scenarios do not justify the vast scale of the current nonprofit sector.
Are there other arguments that might?
120. SHERLOCK & GRAVELLE, supra note 65, at 1-11.
121. It is worth noting that my assignment of some organizational forms to particular
categories here is certainly open to debate; the examples are supposed to be illustrative, not
definitive. For instance, in positing that opera produces negative externalities for its
neighbors, I assume that crowds and noise might be unwanted, and in concluding the same
about wetlands preservation, I assume unhappy neighboring landowners. 
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III. QUALITY OF OUTPUTS 
The previous Part showed that, for the most part, the charitable
deduction cannot be justified simply by pointing to a failure of the
government sector to provide public goods. Yet there may be an
argument for charitable provision even in cases where government,
too, can provide the good: where the quality of what charity would
deliver is superior to what we would expect of government. This
suggestion seems like an obvious line of attack, but because of the
literature’s heavy dependency on Weisbrod and other government-
failure theories, it has never seriously been undertaken. 
Therefore, in this Part, I consider whether there are situations in
which the quality of services charity provides is superior to govern-
ment or, at a minimum, offers something that government provision
alone cannot. For example, in some instances, we see either
insufficient or too much competition between local governments.
Insufficient competition may result from barriers to mobility or
political failures, such as oligopolistic or risk-averse behavior among
public officials. In these cases, competition with charity can serve as
the spur to quality and innovation that competition between
governments does not. On the other hand, excess competition, as in
the infamous “race to the bottom,” may produce an environment
where public goods are low quality. In those situations, charities can
fill the resulting gap.
Put another way, the analysis of this Part represents a relaxation
of the assumptions of the last. Part II argued that in an ideal
federalist system Weisbrod’s assumptions break down. But few real
federalist systems meet those ideals. I consider here how these real-
world failures impact the case for charity.
In addition, as many commentators have recognized, some
charitable functions are inimical to government provision.122 Most
obvious is the separation of church and state.123 Thus, under my
theory, religious organizations would always be eligible for a sub-
sidy; I leave aside for now any line-drawing issues in differentiating
pure worship from other activities in which government might
122. Pozen, supra note 1, at 559 n.131 (collecting sources).
123. Id. at 559.
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reasonably compete. Accordingly, the discussion that follows ad-
dresses only nonchurch charities. 
A. Imperfect Horizontal Competition
Where competition between governments is low, government
services may also be low quality because of weak incentives for
public officials to perform at a high level. A familiar story of
federalism is that competitive pressure from other jurisdictions
motivates officeholders to outperform rivals.124 At times, though,
this competition breaks down. Charity can perform an important
social role by offering a new source of competition for inefficient
governments.
1. Charity as a Substitute for Intergovernmental Competition
Jurisdictional competition improves the quality of local govern-
ment. Free riding and rational ignorance among the local electorate
makes electoral control a relatively loose constraint on slacking and
self-dealing by the elected.125 But a resident deciding whether to
relocate to another jurisdiction to obtain higher-quality services
cannot free ride on others; only she can move.126 Thus, migration
based on quality is less subject to collective-action problems than
voting based on quality.127 The threat of out-migration impacts
officeholders both directly, through a smaller tax base for their pet
projects, and indirectly, as a signal to the remaining voters of the
officeholder’s performance.128 
124. PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 17-19, 25-26, 46-47 (1995); Douglass C.
North, A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History, 16 EXPLORATIONS ECON.
HIST. 249, 255 (1979). But see Jonathan Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism
Preserve Markets?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1530-36 (1997) (arguing that the claim that exit leads
to efficient government depends on unrealistic assumptions about local political process).
125. See, e.g., Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of
Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103,
103-04, 107-08 (1990).
126. See Clayton P. Gillette, Can Public Debt Enhance Democracy?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
937, 965-66 (2008); Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design
28 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 202, 210-11 (2011).
127. Somin, supra note 126, at 212-13.
128. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 346, 400-01 (1990); Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participation in
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Where exit costs are high, competitive federalism breaks down.129
Frictions on moving limit the extent to which people and firms will
relocate to obtain their desired policies.130 These frictions include the
inevitable barriers to moving that everyone faces: moving costs,
cognitive costs of recognizing and evaluating new opportunities, and
the fact that laws are not the only reason to choose a place to live.131
Frictions loom even larger when the choice is not between policies,
but rather only between gradations in the quality of the policy. 
It is worth emphasizing that exit costs are not just the price of a
moving van. They can span tangible and intangible costs of all
kinds, such as lost connections to family and neighbors, or govern-
ment services available in the old regime but not the new.132
Probably one of the more obscure but most important is network
effects—the benefits of having many resources in one place.133
Silicon Valley is what it is in part because of its tremendous
concentration of human capital; if the geniuses dispersed, much of
their collective energy would be lost.134 The opportunity to share in
those economies of concentration is one of the major factors that
keeps people and firms in place, generating locational rents.135 
The importance of locational rents might suggest that charity is
most essential in urban areas, where such concentrations usually
arise,136 but there are exit considerations that favor rural charity as
well. For workers in urban areas, there are often many different
governments to choose from: rings of suburbs surrounding the urban
the Production of Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 26 (2001).
129. See Jacob T. Levy, Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties, 101 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 459, 461 (2007).
130. Oates, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 59, at 1122.
131. Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates,
and the “SALT” Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805, 824-25 (2008).
132. See James M. Buchanan & Charles J. Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An
Assessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 25 (1972) (noting that the Tiebout model
fails to acknowledge locational rents and differing qualities of public goods); Henry W. Herzog
& Alan M. Schlottmann, Labor Force Migration and Allocative Efficiency in the United States:
The Roles of Information and Psychic Costs, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 459, 459-60 (1981).
133. Stefano Breschi & Franco Malerba, The Geography of Innovation and Economic
Clustering: Some Introductory Notes, 10 J. IND. & CORP. CHANGE 817, 819-20 (2001).
134. Id. at 817-18.
135. David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507,
1527.
136. Id.
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core.137 But for those who work in rural areas to change govern-
ments, they likely must also change jobs, or at least face very long
commutes.138 Changing jobs is itself often quite costly.139 So both
urban and rural residents may face high exit costs, although these
costs come in different forms.
Nonprofit firms can fill the competition gap high exit costs pro-
duce.140 If a donor can obtain services from the charity of her choice
without relocating, she acquires a new, low-cost exit option. To
protect their tax base, local officials must attempt to outperform any
potential charitable competitors. In the case of local governments
that themselves subsidize charity, donations automatically reduce
the tax base of the local government.141 Alternatively, the donor may
now vote for lower taxes, to reflect the fact that she has shifted some
of her consumption of public goods away from her local govern-
ment.142
Skeptics might argue that increased competition does not
necessarily equate to higher quality.143 The quality of public goods
137. See Garnett, supra note 85, at 297 (explaining that fragmented governments
surrounding urban cores are fertile ground for Tiebout sorting).
138. Cf. Katherine Porter, Going Broke the Hard Way: The Economics of Rural Failure,
2005 WIS. L. REV. 969, 1009-13 (describing the sparsity of rural jobs and the difficulty of
selling rural homes to change jobs).
139. A number of factors contribute to the costliness of changing jobs. Employees develop
firm-specific capital, or expertise related to their particular employer, which earns them a
premium wage. Lorne Carmichael, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders, 4
BELL J. ECON. 251, 252 (1983). Employers also typically structure wages and benefits to
encourage development of this capital. Id. at 254. For example, employer-based health
insurance produces a significant amount of “job lock”: employees cannot leave without giving
up affordable health care. Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance and Job
Mobility: The Effects of Public Policy on Job Lock, 48 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 86, 86 (1994).
140. Cf. Somin, supra note 126, at 222-23 (noting that privatization may be a lower-cost
alternative than physical exit).
141. Most jurisdictions with an income tax also allow the charitable deduction. WISC.
LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, INFORMATIONAL PAPER NO. 4, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
PROVISIONS IN THE STATES 11 tbl.4 (2009). Other jurisdictions grant charities exemptions from
property or sales taxes, so that as the scope of local charity increases, tax revenues decline.
BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 54 (9th ed. 2007).
142. See Elizabeth Becker & Cotton M. Lindsay, Does the Government Free Ride?, 37 J.L.
& ECON. 277, 279-80 (1994). There is some empirical evidence of this behavior. Id. at 278
(“[D]onations to public colleges and universities result in dollar-for-dollar reductions in
government spending.”).
143. I am grateful to Bill Bratton for this point. 
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is difficult to assess directly.144 Comparisons between two entities,
especially those with somewhat differing goals, might be incre-
mentally more difficult.145 Even if direct quality measures are
available, we might not want too much to depend on them, since the
difficulty of specifying and measuring them might distort the
incentives of government and nonprofit managers.146 
The benefits of charitable alternatives do not depend much,
though, on citizens’ ability to compare precisely the outputs of the
two sectors. “Yardstick” theory suggests that the performance of one
entity gives voters information for evaluating the other, although
perhaps only on fairly general terms.147 Even poor competitors help
set at least a floor for what it is possible to achieve with a given set
of resources. While small disparities in quality may not be observ-
able, extremes of waste and self-serving behavior can be exposed by
comparison to an organization less subject to them.148 Over time,
observing one producer can create benchmarks for the performance
of others, a benefit that nonprofits provide even if there is healthy
intergovernmental competition.149 Fellow voters can then observe
144. See John D. Donahue, Market-Based Governance and the Architecture of
Accountability, in MARKET-BASED GOVERNANCE: SUPPLY SIDE, DEMAND SIDE, UPSIDE AND
DOWNSIDE 1, 5-6 (John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 2002) (describing the difficulties
of arriving at universal definitions of success in areas of public interest, such as schools and
taxes); Hansmann, supra note 2, at 846-47 (noting that separation of donors from beneficiaries
increases information costs of monitoring).
145. See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 508-11 (1996)
(arguing that quality comparisons between nonprofits are infeasible).
146. Galle, supra note 18, at 1225-29.
147. See Paul Belleflamme & Jean Hindriks, Yardstick Competition and Political Agency
Problems, 24 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 155, 162 (2005) (suggesting that the fact that a rival
chooses a policy tells a voter it was more likely that the policy should have been undertaken
by the voter’s own government). Evidence suggests that voters also use these kinds of ballpark
comparisons between governments. E.g., Roger Bivand & Stefan Szymanski, Spatial
Dependence Through Local Yardstick Competition: Theory and Testing, 55 ECON. LETTERS
257, 257-59, 264 (1997) (finding evidence that citizens use yardstick competition to evaluate
trash removal services); Federico Revelli, Performance Rating and Yardstick Competition in
Social Service Provision, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 459, 461-62, 472-73 (2006) (finding that explicit
ratings by national government appeared to crowd out behaviors that theory predicts would
follow from informal citizen comparisons).
148. See Andrei Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 319, 322-23
(1985) (suggesting that government can evaluate firms with opaque cost structures by
comparing them to competitors).
149. See Oguzhan C. Dincer et al., Corruption, Decentralization, and Yardstick
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which entity attracts more support, giving them a kind of “wisdom
of crowds.”150 Rival public-good producers also have incentives to
monitor each other and reveal their competitor’s poor performance
to the public, further helping to overcome voters’ rational igno-
rance.151 
Although yardstick competition’s results play out only slowly over
time, arguably that is a better incentive structure than more vig-
orous competition would provide. Because the immediate rewards
of victory are modest, yardstick competition is a kind of “low-
powered” incentive. But, as I mentioned earlier, the risks posed by
mismeasurement and externalities make high-powered incentives
likely undesirable for producers of public goods.152 
Many other benefits from competition do not depend on voter
comparisons at all. When a local government holds a monopoly on
the production of public goods, it can extract monopoly rents from
constituents in exchange. Studies of government corruption suggest
that political rivals help to bid down the price for these rents.153
Further, the existence of an alternative gives voters an incentive to
monitor their officials more closely, because in the absence of other
choices there would be nothing to do with information gained from
monitoring. Similarly, the existence of an alternative source of
public goods gives more bargaining power to attentive citizens,
allowing them to force public officials away from the officials’ policy
preferences and closer to their own.154 For example, if officials
attempt to extract high taxes by offering a “take it or leave it”
budget with the alternative being an unacceptably low amount of
Competition, 11 ECON. GOVERNANCE 269, 271-74 (2010) (modeling the claim that voters can
draw inferences about their officials based on simple comparisons to other governments over
time).
150. Cf. Marlon G. Boarnet & Amihai Glazer, Federal Grants and Yardstick Competition,
52 J. URBAN ECON. 53, 63-64 (2002) (reporting evidence that voters use federal grants to judge
the quality of their local governments).
151. Donald Wittman, Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1395,
1400 (1989).
152. For more extended discussion on this point, see Galle, supra note 18, at 1225-30.
153. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, The Political Economy of Institutions and
Corruption in American States, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 341, 355, 359-60 (2003); Daniel
Lederman et al., Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter, 17 ECON. & POL.
1, 1-2, 4 (2005). Of course, comparisons also help to reduce corruption. Dincer et al., supra
note 149, at 285, 287.
154. JOHN E. ROEMER, POLITICAL COMPETITION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 5, 52-71 (2006).
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services, nonprofit alternatives allow voters to leave the unwanted
offer on the table.155 Lastly, having another organization ready to
produce public goods allows a jurisdiction to diversify the risk that
the current regime will suffer from total breakdown or take an
ideologically extreme position.
2. Counterarguments: Irrelevant Exit and Crowd-Out
However, this competition-gap theory raises a number of possible
counterarguments. First, the theory assumes that mobility is neces-
sary in order to generate interlocal competition. There are several
alternative sources of competitive pressure other than outright exit,
each of which could arguably make charity unnecessary. For one,
residents can simply threaten to exit unless government reforms.156
Additionally, the benchmarks set by neighbors can put competitive
pressure on each government.157 A third possibility is fluctuations
in the value of property affected by the quality of local government.
Anup Malani, for instance, argues that local homeowners who
observe poor performance by their government will likely lower
their reserve price, driving down home values.158 Mismanagement
can also drive up a town’s cost of borrowing, diminishing the value
of existing bonds.159 These price variations are signals to close
observers of the government’s poor performance, as well as possible
spurs to anger by those who have lost wealth as a result.160
Most of these mechanisms themselves depend on ease of exit,
however. Threats to exit are only credible if the government official
155. See Therese J. McGuire, Proposition 13 and Its Offspring: For Good or Evil, 52 NAT’L
TAX J. 129, 131-33 (1999) (explaining how low reversion budgets can force the public to accept
higher spending than they prefer and noting voter initiatives may reduce this effect by giving
voters agenda-setting power).
156. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 62, at 264-65.
157. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and
Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 30 (1995).
158. Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1280-81
(2008).
159. Gillette, supra note 126, at 975-76.
160. See PETERSON, supra note 124, at 18; Gillette, supra note 126, at 952 (“[M]issed
payments provide a readily detectable indication of mismanagement.”); Ethan Yale & Brian
Galle, Muni Bonds and the Commerce Clause After United Haulers, 115 TAX NOTES 1037,
1044 (2007).
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believes that exit costs are lower than the value of the demands.161
Yardstick competition, similarly, probably works mostly as an
implicit threat of exit.162 Rationally ignorant voters will not bother
to compare their own officials with others. So the only residents who
are likely to pay attention to yardsticks are those who might move
to the better-performing neighbor. Malani’s predicted decline in
home prices rests on the assumption that individuals will be less
interested in living in the jurisdiction, driving down demand for
housing.163 Although there is no obvious exit story to tell about
bondholders, in all likelihood bondholders will free ride on the
monitoring efforts of other bondholders, just as voters do.164 Thus,
where exit is difficult, charity remains the most promising source of
pressure on local government. 
A second potential counter to the competition story is that, just as
with Weisbrod’s government-failure account, subsidizing charity
may be a cure that is worse than the disease. Recall that the sub-
sidy distorts a resident’s choice between moving and charity.165
However, the costs of charity are largely externalities for the resi-
dent, so that she may choose charity instead of moving, even where
that reduces overall social welfare.166 It is difficult to predict, as a
matter of theory, whether this loss would be larger than the social
gains from additional sources of competition for local governments.
When charities are competing with government over quality,
though, the potential losses are smaller, due to a phenomenon
economists call “crowd-out.”167 This is a key difference between the
competition rationale and Weisbrod’s supra-median voter story. In
Weisbrod’s version, there is no government that provides the public
good, so that donors who pay for the service shell out only once.168
161. See Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV.
563, 601 (1983) (stating that state officials’ opportunities to extract rents from firms are
limited by firms’ exit costs). 
162. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 62, at 264-65.
163. See Malani, supra note 158, at 1288-90.
164. See Brian Galle & Ethan Yale, Can Discriminatory State Taxation of Municipal Bonds
Be Justified?, 117 TAX NOTES 153, 155 (2007).
165. See supra text accompanying note 63.
166. I assume here that the positive externality resulting from better competition would
be similar under either moving or charity. 
167. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 510.
168. See Weisbrod, supra note 12, at 175.
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But if the reason the donor gives to charity is simply because she is
dissatisfied with the quality of the available good, she is in effect
paying for it twice: once through her tax dollars, and again through
her donation. For instance, if graduates of my local high school can
hardly read, and I want an elite institution in the town, I will have
to fund a second school.169 Unless I value superior education very
highly, I am unlikely to pay so much for it—the existence of the
government program, for which I have no choice but to pay, dis-
courages me from buying additional private education. So govern-
ment provision of low-quality goods may crowd out charitable
provision of superior alternatives.170 
The double-payment problem enhances the expected value of the
deduction.171 Crowd-out increases the likelihood that the subsidy is
“treasury-efficient,” that is, that $1 of subsidy produces at least $1
of additional public goods. Recall that subsidies run the risk of some
waste because of inframarginal purchasers: money is spent on
people who would have bought the good anyway. But where the cost
of purchasing the good is increased as a result of the double-
payment problem, the amount of waste decreases, since there will
be fewer citizens who are inframarginal—fewer who would have
been willing to pay the higher price.172
Therefore, although in general the exact welfare effects of a
subsidy remain hard to predict, the double-payment problem at
least makes it more likely that the subsidy is efficient. While charity
is likely overproduced in Weisbrod’s scenario, here crowd-out makes
charity more likely to be underproduced, so that the deduction has
a better chance of bringing total output closer to the social optimum. 
169. See generally Sam Peltzman, The Effect of Government Subsidies-in-Kind on Private
Expenditures: The Case of Higher Education, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1973) (modeling how free
public education may crowd out private schools). 
170. For discussion of empirical efforts to measure crowd-out, see infra Part III.E. The
charitable deduction does not eliminate double payment. A deduction operates to reduce
taxable income, not the tax actually due. Suppose I earn $100,000 and pay a 10 percent local
tax, which for simplicity we can assume is spent entirely on the local opera. If I donate $1,000
to a rival opera, and earn a $1,000 deduction, I reduce my taxable income to $99,000. But that
only reduces the amount of tax I pay from $10,000 to $9,900. So my total opera expenditures
now are $10,900. Only a dollar-for-dollar credit on tax due, which no state has ever adopted
or, to my knowledge, even seriously contemplated, would eliminate the double-payment
problem. 
171. For a mathematical model, see Galle, supra note 68, at 13-17.
172. Id. at 16-17.
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However, this efficiency story is harder to tell when potential
donors all reside in the same jurisdiction. In that event, the donors
can avoid double payment by the simple expedient of banding
together to vote or lobby to cut spending on the low-quality govern-
ment service.173 Although they will face the ubiquitous free-rider
problem in their efforts, the subsidy greatly aids their cause by
forming charities, which allow donors to easily identify others who
are similarly situated, transact face-to-face with those others at
charity events, and hire staff who can coordinate their efforts.174 
In short, where consumers live close together, the deduction may
again overproduce charity. Colocated donors can much more easily
combine their donation with a vote to lower their taxes. For exam-
ple, there is evidence that charitable giving to education reduces
local government education spending.175 In these instances where
charity “crowds out” government, there is no double payment, and
so charity is less likely to be cost-effective. 
This analysis implies that the amount or availability of the de-
duction should depend on where its supporters reside. Admittedly,
it is hard to imagine how to administer a rule that makes the de-
duction vary depending on where donors live. I will suggest some
practical solutions to this problem in Part IV.A. 
B. Inadequate Vertical Competition
Another theme of the federalism literature is that the existence
of viable local governments improves the quality of the federal
government.176 James Madison, for example, argued that the states
would compete with the national government for the loyalty of the
public, with the winner earning the right to deliver services in
exchange for political rewards.177 Here, too, the competitive mech-
anism may at times break down, leaving a theoretical opportunity
173. See Becker & Lindsay, supra note 142, at 279-80. 
174. See Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575, 590 (1982); cf.
Brakman Reiser, supra note 29, at 876-77 (discussing the ways in which membership in
nonprofit organization facilitates political action).
175. Becker & Lindsay, supra note 142, at 278.
176. See supra note 78.
177. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 78, at 291.
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for charities to step in as rivals for the affections of the public.178 In
practice, though, charities likely cannot fill this role. 
As we have already seen, localities are often unlikely competitors
for national government when the scope of the service is national.
Each smaller government has incentives to free ride on any effort
others might make.179 A single national government does not have
this problem. Similarly, states may be inadequate competition for
the federal government because of economies of scale: it can be far
more efficient to provide a particular service across huge expanses
of territory or population.180 
For instance, it may be more efficient to provide clean water at
the national level because of spillovers between states.181 Interstate
bargains to guarantee clean water are unlikely to materialize
because polluter states can have incentives to be the last to the
bargaining table, leading to holdout problems.182 Compacts can also
lead to a “team-production” problem for participating officials: none
have incentives to work to ensure the success of the project, because
they can free ride on the efforts of others and blame the others for
any failures.183
Another breakdown arises from the fact that the optimal level of
government for the production of a public good may vary over time.
Optimality is the result of a set of trade-offs.184 For example,
although there may be economies of scale, larger governments are
harder for the public to interact with and control.185 Not all of these
factors are stable over time. Technological changes might make
monitoring government officials easier.186 Or the addition of new
178. Cf. Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a
Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 572 (1998) (noting that the
Madisonian idea of divided authority resembles features of the nonprofit sector).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
180. Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 59, at 84-86. States can “scale up” to solve these
problems by forming interstate compacts, but compacts introduce additional bargaining and
cross-monitoring costs. See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 108-15 (2000).
181. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1215-16 (1977).
182. See COOTER, supra note 180, at 113.
183. See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 325 (1982).
184. See Oates, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 59, at 1120.
185. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 58-59
(2004).
186. See Jane S. Schacter, Digitally Democratizing Congress? Technology and Political
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services at one level might create economies or diseconomies of
scope with the existing services.187 
However, even as the optimal level for the delivery of a good is
fluid, the actual provision of the good can be “sticky.” Officials
accustomed to receiving political rents for delivering a particular
service will be unlikely to give up the rents.188 Winning budget space
for the service from officials in the alternative tier of government
will be more difficult, as there is not yet any constituency in that
government for the service.189 Bureaucrats who carry out the project
might resist reassignment because of connections with patrons or
peers in their existing organizational structure.190 And lobbyists who
have purchased relational capital with officials in one government
will be reluctant to start over elsewhere.191 
James Buchanan and his various coauthors have likewise argued
that government in general is too sticky. In Buchanan’s argument,
increased taxation is a one-way ratchet, so that once we have added
to the size of the bureaucracy, we have created a political force that
will resist its own downsizing.192 Buchanan claims that competition
between governments can check the forces of expansion, but that
collusion between officials at different levels may allow all of them
to expand without limit.193 
Accountability, 89 B.U. L. REV. 641, 648-73 (2009).
187. See PARISI & FON, supra note 89, at 53-54.
188. See Craig Volden, Intergovernmental Grants: A Formal Model of Interrelated National
and Subnational Political Decisions, 37 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 209, 219 (2007).
189. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11-13 (2007).
190. Cf. Dara Kay Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political
Design of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REV. 673, 687-88 (2006) (describing bureaucratic
resistance to internal restructuring); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 658 (1998) (making
this point about privatization).
191. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation, in THE
REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY: AN ASSESSMENT 111, 133-34 (George C. Eads & Michael Fix
eds., 1984).
192. GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 163-67 (1980).
193. Id. at 173-91; see also Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions:
Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 3 (1995)
(developing the argument that competitive federalism restrains opportunity for governments
to appropriate private property). 
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In theory, charitable provision of public goods can solve all these
sets of problems. As spontaneous organizations, charities can be
designed to match the ideal geographic distribution of the desired
goods.194 A charitable enterprise can be scaled up to account for the
scope of the problem or for economies of size,195 as with the Gates
Foundation’s effort to tackle malaria and global poverty.196 As the
appropriate scale changes, charities can either change their oper-
ations or wind up their affairs and transfer their assets back to
stakeholders for reallocation. And charities could be a sort of tem-
porary government, adding to society’s capacity to produce public
goods in times of great need—in the aftermath of natural disasters,
for example197—without raising the danger of Buchanan’s one-way
ratchet. 
In current practice the charitable picture is not quite as promis-
ing. Under state laws governing both charitable trusts and cor-
porations, it is extraordinarily difficult to change the charitable
purposes of an organization, including the geographic scope of its
operations.198 For instance, in one famous case, a court refused to
allow a charity to broaden its mission beyond a single county in
California, notwithstanding the charity’s huge accumulation of
resources and the considerable wealth of that county.199 State and
federal law both sharply limit the use of charitable resources upon
194. This is the point Clay Gillette makes in favor of residential associations. Clayton P.
Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1388-89 (1994). 
195. See Atkinson, supra note 1, at 583-84.
196. Chandler H. Udo, Note, Nongovernmental Organizations and African Governments:
Seeking an Effective International Legal Framework in a New Era of Health and Development
Aid, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 371, 376-77 & n.36 (2008).
197. Current law includes disaster relief as one of the permissible goals of a 501(c)(3)
organization. For an overview and assessment, see Danshera Cords, Charitable Contributions
for Disaster Relief: Rationalizing Tax Consequences and Victim Benefits, 57 CATH. U. L. REV.
427, 434-62 (2008).
198. See Marion R. Fremont-Smith, The Search for Greater Accountability of Nonprofit
Organizations: Recent Legal Developments and Proposals for Change, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
609, 622-28 (2007) (discussing the cy pres doctrine); Linda Sugin, Resisting the
Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM
L. REV. 893, 898-901 (2007) (discussing the duty of obedience). Recent reforms in trust law
have somewhat loosened standards, but change can still be had only when the original
purposes of a restricted gift are impractical. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 173-75 (2004).
199. Estate of Buck, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442, 442-43 (Ct. App. 1994); see also John G. Simon,
American Philanthropy and the Buck Trust, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 641 (1987).
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dissolution of the charity.200 And managers committed and invested
in a charitable enterprise can be just as reluctant as bureaucrats to
change course.201 Indeed, if managers self-select based on ideological
commitments, and this self-selection is more prevalent in the
charitable sector because of the predictable weakness of oversight
by those with differing views,202 managers of charities will be even
less flexible than government. 
Although of course it is possible to reform the law of charity to
move towards greater flexibility, that change would carry some
costs. The inflexibility of charity may be an asset to firms. By
helping to guarantee that managers cannot easily change the way
the firm’s resources are used, inflexible rules may lower the “agency
costs” of contributing, thus encouraging donations, managerial
talent, or the effort of volunteers.203 Reforming the law of charity to
loosen these ties might enable charity to better supplement
government, but it would also weaken those charities that do not
perform these supplementary functions. 
Thus, even though there is a solid theoretical case for charity as
a supplement to vertical competition, employing charity for that
purpose may ultimately reduce social welfare by undermining the
capacity for charity to fulfill other functions. Still, that does leave
charity with the narrow function of offering competition for the
federal government in cases where the scope of the good crosses
state borders.
C. Excess Competition
It is a familiar point that mobility and jurisdictional competition
can produce races to the bottom as well as the top.204 When capital
200. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(4) (2009); MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES:
CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS, AND ASSOCIATIONS § 15-10 (2000).
201. See Hansmann, supra note 9, at 521.
202. See supra note 17.
203. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621,
658-63 (2004) (making this point about contributions to trusts in general). What is presently
unclear is the marginal value of additional restraints on managers; in other words, we do not
know how much additional giving results from changes in agency costs. See Rob Atkinson,
Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1123 (1993) (noting uncertainty about
whether strict application of cy pres doctrine is necessary to encourage giving).
204. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
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is mobile, local jurisdictions face choices between their regulatory
preferences and their ability to attract investment.205 Similarly,
individuals who prefer not to spend money on redistributive
programs, or prefer to free ride on the redistributive efforts of
others, will put downward pressure on any efforts to redistribute
wealth at the local level.206 Jurisdictions that do offer redistributive
benefits may attract migrants who are net consumers of tax dollars,
prompting cuts in benefits or the flight of those who must fund the
transfers.207 
It is less well known that frictions on mobility permit some level
of local redistribution and regulation, but the need to create
frictions reduces the quality of those goods. Clay Gillette and others
have noted that the cost of moving gives localities the power to exact
“locational rents” from mobile firms and residents: that is, redistri-
bution is possible but is capped by the firm’s exit costs.208 Roberta
Romano adds that to induce investment in the first place, a
jurisdiction must also credibly promise not to exact all of the value
of investment.209 Since talk is cheap, this promise must, to be
credible, be backed by some guarantee that reneging will be
costly.210 As a result, any effort at local redistribution must include
some costly mechanism to commit the state to not tax away future
gains, leaving less money available for actual redistribution. 
Accordingly, if we rely solely on the government sector to produce
redistribution, we are left with two choices, both flawed. Although
local redistributive programs are more prevalent than basic
economic theory predicts, they persist only at substantial cost. The
YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974).
205. E.g., Stewart, supra note 181, at 1211-12.
206. Michael I. Luger, Federal Tax Reform and the Interjurisdictional Mobility Impulse,
23 J. URB. ECON. 235, 236 (1988).
207. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 455. For reviews of the empirical evidence
on whether localized benefits attract poor migrants, see Jan K. Brueckner, Welfare Reform
and the Race to the Bottom: Theory and Evidence, 66 S. ECON. J. 505, 514-18 (2000); Robert
Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 30-36
(1992).
208. See Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial
Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1082-84 (2007); cf. Schleicher, supra note 135, at 1515-
29 (reviewing scholarship about the relative costs and benefits of urbanization). 
209. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 235-36 (1985).
210. Id.
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alternative, of course, would be to run these programs at the federal
level. But federal production of redistribution, as I have already
mentioned, may leave many voters dissatisfied with the level of
benefits and will likely lack pluralism and diversity.211
Charitable provision can mitigate some of the problems of local
redistribution. Obviously, voluntary donors do not flee, so those with
a preference for redistributing their own wealth can do so without
fear that high tax rates will drive away those who contribute to the
cost of redistribution. In the regulatory context, charities are not
limited to extracting locational rents and need not offer costly
commitments. 
In other respects charity can be subject to similar limitations as
government, at least when the charity is focused on a narrow geo-
graphic area. Redistribution may change the geographic preferences
of beneficiaries, and local governments might further reduce their
own redistribution to offset that change. For instance, a high-quality
homeless shelter might attract new homeless individuals who are
costly to the local government in other ways, such as through higher
Medicaid costs. The government might respond by cutting those
other benefits, or otherwise making itself more unattractive to poor
newcomers.212 If cuts are not possible, some wealthier taxpayers
might exit to avoid higher costs. Similarly, charitable efforts to
redistribute away other people’s money, such as through quasi-
regulatory charities, might drive away capital.213 Here, again, local
government might respond by deregulating in other areas, or by
granting targeted tax breaks that redistribute wealth back to the
“regulated” industry. 
Offsetting and distortionary effects might be mitigated if the
charity carries out its mission more widely. Distributing benefits in
many places means that migrants will be less attracted to any one
jurisdiction. And widespread regulation offers “regulated” capital
fewer jurisdictions to which it might plausibly flee.  
211. See supra text accompanying notes 115-18.
212. For evidence of these kinds of offsetting responses, see generally Nora Gordon, Do
Federal Grants Boost State Spending? Evidence from Title I, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1771 (2004).
213. Of course, charities cannot regulate in the sense of exerting the coercive power of the
State, but investigation, disclosure, shaming, and boycotts could potentially obtain similar
results. 
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With these geographic caveats in mind, my analysis does gen-
erally confirm the long-standing tradition of charity as an aid for the
poor. I add to the conventional wisdom by showing that the same
logic can also apply to quasi-regulatory public goods. In addition, by
attending to the nuances of what makes charity a good vehicle for
redistribution, I have revealed the limits of that logic. Contrary to
some received wisdom, local jurisdictions can redistribute, but in
many instances their efforts will be costlier or of lower quality than
charity. In these instances, in particular, charity can make the
largest contribution, especially if its focus is not as geographically
narrow as that of local governments. 
D. Warm Glow
One final qualitative difference between charity and government,
which some commentators suggest may warrant the deduction, is
that donations produce a personal satisfaction for donors that
dutifully paying taxes does not.214 For example, David Schizer
argues that the act of giving creates some personal satisfaction for
the giver, so that public goods funded by donations result in higher
overall social welfare than government spending alone.215 Following
the economic literature, he distinguishes this “warm glow” from
pure altruism.216 An altruist cares only about the welfare of the
donee and so is indifferent between two equally effective spending
programs.217 In contrast, the warm-glow giver gets rewards from
being the agent of change, whether because she is satisfied by
thinking of herself as a good person or because she enjoys the social
approval and status that may come with being seen by others as
generous.218 In the latter view, warm-glow donations are like Gucci
214. KAPLOW, supra note 70, at 270-71; Schizer, supra note 15, at 225-26, 230-31; see also
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 717 (arguing that charity is better at creating warm glow
than government or for-profits). But see Gergen, supra note 1, at 1409 (noting that self-
regarding motives may result in excessive societal investment in giving).
215. Schizer, supra note 15, at 225-26.
216. Id. at 226. For a review of the warm-glow literature, see B. Douglas Bernheim &
Antonio Rangel, Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare and Policy Analysis with Non-
Standard Decision Makers 56-60 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11518,
2005). 
217. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 713.
218. Id. at 712-13; see also Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 216, at 58. Of course, any given
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handbags: they are a status good.219 Schizer acknowledges, but does
not confront head-on, Peter Diamond’s critique of the use of warm
glow as a normative justification for charity.220 Diamond argues that
even if the warm-glow explanation for why giving occurs is correct
as a descriptive matter, it does not follow that warm-glow giving
increases welfare.221 Among other points, he observes that apparent
warm-glow advantages of giving over paying taxes may actually
result from donor misperception of the efficacy of government or
from the framing of donations, taxes, and spending.222 Thus, to
determine whether warm glow should be added to social welfare, we
must decide whether to count these forms of misinformed pref-
erences, a subject on which there is currently no agreement in the
economic community.223 Another point of controversy arises over
whether a social planner should take account of “relative pref-
erences,” that is, a person’s desire simply to outdo her neighbor
—say, with a Gucci handbag.224 Some argue that, in the aggregate,
these preferences are zero sum, and so we cannot count the feelings
of superior status as adding to welfare unless we also count the
feelings of inferior status.225 
Another point mentioned only in passing by Diamond is critical
to the trade-off between donations and taxes. As Diamond and
others note, it is possible that what is described as a warm glow is
actually the relief we feel in satisfying social pressure to be good or
donation may be offered out of a mix of pure altruism and warm glow. 
219. Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, A Signaling Explanation for Charity, 86 AM. ECON.
REV. 1019, 1019-21 (1996).
220. Schizer, supra note 15, at 226-27 & n.16 (citing Diamond, supra note 64, at 909).
221. Diamond, supra note 64, at 915-17.
222. Id. at 916.
223. For a survey of the disagreement and some suggested solutions see Galle, supra note
131, at 818-24, 842-51.
224. For overviews of the relative preferences debate, see ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE
RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS 5 (1985); Richard H. McAdams,
Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 26-69 (1992) (describing generally how individuals
measure themselves against one another and the effects of relative references on market
equilibriums). For evidence on the empirical significance of relative preferences, see Fredrik
Carlsson et al., Do You Enjoy Having More than Others? Survey Evidence of Positional Goods,
74 ECONOMICA 586, 587-93 (2007).
225. See McAdams, supra note 224, at 4-5. It should be noted that the counting does not
necessarily net out to zero if positive and negative feelings are asymmetrical, or if some of the
points of comparison are outside the society whose welfare we are trying to maximize. 
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generous.226 To the extent that we all feel this pressure, but only
some of us can fully satisfy it, the norm may actually reduce welfare
overall. On this account, donations are psychologically indis-
tinguishable from paying taxes. A wide literature on tax compliance
claims that, given the rarity of tax audits and small size of most
sanctions, it is likely that most people pay their taxes because they
have internalized a compliance norm and fear psychological
discomfort or social ostracization if they fail to comply.227 Hence, if
this picture of warm glow is accurate, charitable giving is no
different than paying taxes.
A warm-glow justification for the deduction could also be circular.
Warm glow results in some measure from meeting the approval of
a social monitor, whether internal or external.228 But the expecta-
tions of the monitors may themselves be a product of the deduction.
Perhaps, as Rob Atkinson has argued, the legal regime for charity
helps to establish a social norm and practice of altruism.229 Or
perhaps the existence of the deduction and other supports for
charity help the charitable sector to spend resources developing its
own kind of brand.230 Thus, while warm glow may be a reason to
continue the deduction’s existence once it is firmly entrenched,
standing alone it is a weak justification for choosing charity over
government when we are designing on a blank slate. 
E. Treasury Efficiency
A final possible situational argument in favor of charity is that it
might be a thriftier use of government dollars than direct spending.
226. Diamond, supra note 64, at 917; see also Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 216, at 58-59;
Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic
Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 329 (1977).
227. Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 112
(2009); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1468-84 (2003); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms:
The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1785-91, 1806-10 (2000).
228. See Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 216, at 58; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 713
n.10, 714.
229. Atkinson, supra note 1, at 632. 
230. Cf. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 111-12 (40th anniv. ed. 1998)
(arguing that decades of private-sector advertising had convinced the public that the quality
of government services was lower than the private sector’s). 
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For one thing, it is possible that the subsidy is so effective at
triggering private spending that each dollar of subsidy results in
more than one dollar of giving.231 If that were true, then devoting a
dollar to the subsidy would result in more public goods, all else
equal, than a dollar of direct government provision. In addition, gov-
ernment provision could crowd out some private giving that might
have occurred—for example, because of altruism—absent govern-
ment.232 
But subsidies for charity also have some fiscal disadvantages.
Charities do not spend all of the money they receive on public goods;
much is consumed in fundraising, a cost the government does not
incur.233 Moreover, as noted earlier, subsidies given to inframarginal
donors are, from a social perspective, wasted.234 Thus, theory is
indeterminate whether subsidies are a more efficient use of gov-
ernment treasury dollars.235 
Empirical research offers only tenuous evidence for the treasury
efficiency hypothesis. Studies of the price elasticity of giving have
varied widely; one synthesis found that one dollar of an income tax
subsidy produced about $1.10 in charitable spending,236 while the
231. CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 280-81 (1985).
The responsiveness of giving to the amount of the subsidy is usually known as the “price
elasticity of philanthropy.” William Vickrey, Private Philanthropy and Public Finance, in
ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 149, 153 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975). 
232. Russell D. Roberts, Financing Public Goods, 95 J. POL. ECON. 420, 420-35 (1987).
233. See Pozen, supra note 1, at 557-58. Of course, the government must collect taxes, but
recall that in order to provide the subsidy, the government must raise taxes. These tax-
collection costs are thus present for both subsidies and direct provision.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66. For examples of the forms of wasteful
charities that may arise as a result of overincentivization, see ROB REICH ET AL., STANFORD
U. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AND CIVIL SOC’Y, ANYTHING GOES: APPROVAL OF NON-PROFIT
STATUS BY THE IRS (2009), available at http://pacscenter.stanford.edu/practitioners/published-
papers.
235. A bit more formally, suppose that under a subsidy the amount spent on public goods
is equal to e, the price-elasticity of giving, times the subsidy amount S, plus a voluntary giving
amount V, less the costs of fundraising F. On the other side of our inequality, we could put
G, the amount of government spending, plus V, minus C, the amount of V that is crowded out
by G. The question then is whether e*S + V - F > G + V - C, or more simply whether e*S - F
> G - C. 
236. John Peloza & Piers Steel, The Price Elasticities of Charitable Contributions: A Meta-
Analysis, 24 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 260, 265 & tbl.1 (2005). Probably the most thorough
examination to date is Jon Bakija & Bradley T. Heim, How Does Charitable Giving Respond
to Incentives and Income? New Estimates from Panel Data, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 615 (2011). Bakija
and Heim report a federal elasticity of about 0.9, and a combined federal-state elasticity of
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Congressional Research Service estimated a highly inefficient $0.50
spent per $1 in subsidy.237 Measures of crowd-out are also highly
divergent, with one well-known study finding crowd-out of about
$0.19 for every $1 of government spending.238 That is almost the
precise amount an average charity spends on fundraising.239 So, at
best, charity appears to offer only a small price advantage over
government.240 
F. Some General Objections
Although I have identified some possible advantages to the
charitable form, there remain some possible costs to subsidized
charity as well. Changing the justification for the subsidy does not
eliminate all of the weaknesses I mentioned earlier. For one, there
remains the problem that some goods might actually be overpro-
about 1.1, meaning that $1.00 in incentives produces $1.10 in giving. Id. at 639. But they also
argue that a combined result of as high as 1.4 is not implausible. Id.
237. SHERLOCK & GRAVELLE, supra note 65, at 49. Both of these numbers may overestimate
the efficacy of subsidies. It is possible that deductibility merely changes the form of income-
tax reporting of contributions, rather than increasing donations. See Ellen P. Aprill, Churches,
Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 861 (2001). In
addition, existing studies do not distinguish between charities that are subject to crowd-out
and those that are not. My theory implies higher treasury efficiency for charities that might
be crowded out by government, because those are less likely oversubsidized. See supra text
accompanying note 171.
238. Bruce R. Kingma & Robert McClelland, Public Radio Stations Are Really, Really Not
Public Goods: Charitable Contributions and Impure Altruism, 66 ANNALS PUB. &
COOPERATIVE ECON. 65, 65-76 (1995) (summarizing other findings and reporting authors’ own
study). Another study by two well-known economists found crowd-out of 30 percent during the
1930s. Jonathan Gruber & Daniel M. Hungerman, Faith-Based Charity and Crowd-Out
During the Great Depression, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 1043, 1043 (2007). Two other economists found
that it was zero. David C. Ribar & Mark O. Wilhelm, Altruistic and Joy-of-Giving Motivations
in Charitable Behavior, 110 J. POL. ECON. 425, 425 (2002). Some studies have found divergent
results within the same data set. E.g., A. Abigail Payne, Does the Government Crowd-Out
Private Donations? New Evidence from a Sample of Non-Profit Firms, 69 J. PUB. ECON. 323
(1998) (finding crowd-out of either zero or $0.50 per dollar, depending on statistical method).
239. James Andreoni & A. Abigail Payne, Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising?
Evidence from a Panel of Charities, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 334, 341 (2011) (finding that fundraising
costs were just under 20 percent within their sample).
240. In terms of the earlier inequality, the results are $1.10 - 0.20 > $1.00 - 0.19. That is,
one dollar spent on charity produces $0.90 in spending, while the same dollar produces $0.81
in public goods if spent on government provision. Furthermore, even the most generous
figures assume that the quality of both sectors is comparable, which may well be an
unfounded assumption.
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duced from society’s perspective. As just noted, donors do not inter-
nalize the cost of subsidizing their activities. And, again, charitable
production of public goods can produce positive and negative
externalities, the latter of which might be mitigated if the good were
not produced or produced through government instead. For
example, if social insurance produces moral hazard, that will be true
no matter who offers the insurance.241 The deadweight losses of the
resulting moral hazard will largely be externalities to the charity.242 
In contrast, governments at least include stakeholders who may
be affected by negative externalities. Employers who face a smaller
workforce as a result of the labor-reducing effects of social insur-
ance, for example, can vote and lobby. These stakeholders may exert
political pressure to reduce moral hazard, keeping social insurance
closer to the optimal level. At a minimum, the opportunity for con-
trary views to enter the policy-making process encourages planners
to consider and deliberate the right course of action.243
Additionally, complementing government programs through an
outside organization sacrifices any economies of scope that society
might achieve by integrating the two programs.244 For instance, it
might be much more effective to coordinate education with chil-
dren’s public health than to attempt each separately.
Some of these problems, however, are a product of the current law
of charity, rather than an immutable feature of the sector. In the
next Part, I offer some suggestions for reforming charity law to
render it more deliberative and more receptive to the needs of
outsiders.
241. See Schizer, supra note 15, at 226.
242. Cf. Zywicki, supra note 105, at 879-81 (arguing that environmental organizations do
not fully internalize social costs of environmental protection because their members do not
bear many of those costs).
243. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 486, 523-24 (2002); cf. Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs,
Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 749, 790-814 (2008) (measuring market valuation of agency costs inherent in trust form).
244. Cf. M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for
Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 575, 590-93 (2009) (making this argument for superiority
of for-profit firms over charities). Of course, in some cases charities can also experience
economies of scope. Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business
Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 605, 608-09, 626-33 (1989).
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G. Summary 
Overall, there is a solid case for subsidies for charity as a way of
improving the quality of public goods. The charitable sector is a
necessary competitor for government where moving costs to obtain
a particular service are high, where the states cannot easily scale up
to rival the federal government, or where the public good in question
would distort locational decisions. Even if the charity itself does not
actually outperform government, the threat of competition may
improve the government’s performance. The subsidy and the struc-
ture of charities, however, may themselves create some economic
distortions. I attempt to synthesize these strengths and weaknesses
in the next Part. 
IV. TOWARDS A NEW FOUNDATION FOR CHARITY
If my argument so far is at all persuasive, it is an argument not
only for a theoretical reappraisal of charity, but also a legal one. The
traditional conceptions of charity have heavily influenced the shape
of current U.S. law.245 As those rationales evolve, so too should the
law. Thus, in this Part, I set out tentative ideas for reforming the
system the United States uses for allocating subsidies for charity.
I focus on the method for determining what projects qualify as
“charitable.” Part IV.A synthesizes the theory so far into a single,
more or less coherent definition of what activities should count as
“charity” eligible for subsidy. Part IV.B offers a legal regime for
making that decision, contrasts it with the current regime, and
explains the benefits of my proposed procedure. Part IV.C responds
to the view, long-entrenched in the existing law, that government
cannot be trusted to pass judgment on the merits of prospective
charitable organizations. 
A. What is “Charity” Under a Comparative-Advantage Rationale?
Under the comparative-advantage theory I have laid out here, the
legal definition of charity is not a single concept but is instead the
245. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 1, at 332-39 (tracing influence of notions of charity
on the creation of § 501(c)(3)).
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end product of several overlapping policy arguments. Modern U.S.
law does have a somewhat unified conception of charity: most
entities can qualify for their subsidy by showing that they provide
something for which there is a private market failure.246 As I have
shown, however, market failure is only the beginning of the story.
Charity also has costs, and it is uncertain whether these costs
outweigh the gains to be had from solving the markets’ paralysis.
Some costs could also be contained or eliminated by providing the
good through government instead. I have suggested a number of
factors that make it more likely any given charity will leave society
better off. Given a market failure, the very strongest case for a
charitable over government solution is when donors incur high exit
costs, the good in question is provided across a wide geographical
region, and it is redistributive in character. 
1. Exit Costs
Exit is central to the comparative-advantage rationale. As I have
explained, easy mobility from one jurisdiction to another, or the
credible threat of it, is vital to high-quality local government. As
moving becomes costlier and more difficult, therefore, charity’s role
as a substitute for horizontal competition rises in importance.
Further, when the cost of moving is high, the net social welfare from
charity is higher, because charity saves society the costs of the
move. 
 As I described earlier, though, exit costs can be highly subjective.
The value of living in one place may depend on personal ties and
tastes, not to mention the structure of a worker’s employment con-
tract. Given the difficulty of assessing these factors on an individual
basis, the role of exit is probably to set a general baseline for the
need for charity. In a society where exit costs are high overall, such
as one in which there are large disparities in locational rents, the
case for all forms of charity is stronger, and society should be more
generous with organizations seeking the subsidy. More homogenous
societies, or those in which labor mobility is easy, might set the bar
higher for obtaining a subsidy. The modern United States likely
246. See HOPKINS, supra note 141, at 103-09 (discussing the process of determining
whether an organization operates for a tax-exempt purpose).
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falls on the lower end of the exit-cost spectrum for individuals.247 A
more nuanced analysis of exit costs is possible to the extent that
costs also correlate with other important factors. 
2. Broad-Based Services
Exit costs, together with several other points I have mentioned,
suggest that the subsidy is more defensible when the good to be sub-
sidized is delivered across a wide geographical area.
a. Vertical Competition
For one, wide distribution raises the possibility of vertical
competition—that the charity will compete not only with local gov-
ernments but also with the national government. Again, charities
are especially vital when acting as a potential rival to the national
government, because state and local governments cannot easily do
so and often lack incentives to deliver services that would benefit
other, competing jurisdictions.248
Subsidies are important in a vertical competition story because
of the vast fiscal advantages of the national government. The
federal government usually enjoys economies of scale and scope
compared to charity; large foundations can turn the tables, but only
in those few policy areas where they can concentrate their time and
resources.249 Governments can borrow, giving them huge flexibility
in terms of maintaining liquidity, responding to urgent needs, and
spreading the costs of a long-lasting capital project across the
lifetime of the project.250 Charities can also borrow, but those
seeking to borrow in excess of the value of their assets can borrow
247. Michael J. Greenwood, Internal Migration in Developed Countries, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
POPULATION AND FAMILY ECONOMICS 648, 651-55 (Mark R. Rosenzweig & Oded Stark eds.,
1997).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 180-97.
249. See JOEL L. FLEISHMAN, THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET: HOW
AMERICAN WEALTH IS CHANGING THE WORLD 3-11 (2007).
250. See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 894-95 (describing advantages of government
financing).
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against only the uncertainty of future donations or revenues, which
leads to higher borrowing costs than government.251 
b. Horizontal Competition 
Broad-based services also strengthen the case for subsidy as a
support for horizontal competition. Recall that crowd-out makes
subsidies more appealing: when a donor must pay twice to get a
higher-quality public good, she is rather less likely to do so, in-
creasing the need for a subsidy.252 Donors who reside close together
can vote or lobby to eliminate the government-provided good
entirely, and they pay only once. As a result, organizations funded
by these donors are more likely inefficient, at least in the case in
which there are negative externalities from production of the good
that could be eliminated if the organization relocated. These donors
may also be over-subsidized. A subsidy that is large enough to
overcome free riding when the donor must pay for both charity and
similar government service will be too large for other goods. 
It is difficult to imagine an administrable system in which an
organization’s eligibility depends on where its donors reside, but the
nature of the good provided by the charity can be an effective proxy.
Many public goods, by their nature, can only usefully be consumed
locally.253 Think of trash collection, policing, fire prevention, and
public parks. For these forms of services, at least, we can be fairly
confident that the consumers are necessarily bunched closely
together. Other services are inherently nonlocal, such as theoretical
scientific research or endangered-species conservation; in all
likelihood the funders of such goods are widely scattered and cannot
effectively offset their charitable spending with reductions in local
taxes. Yet other services are somewhere in between, combining local
benefits with additional spillovers that diffuse more widely, such as
251. See id. at 877; Norman I. Silber, Charitable Debt Calamity: How Nonprofits Fell into
the Auction-Rate Trap; and the Problems that Lie Ahead 6-13 (Jan. 10, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that bank lending to charities is based largely on
expanding value of charitable real estate). Both charities and local governments can offer tax-
exempt bonds. I.R.C. § 103 (2006). 
252. See supra text accompanying notes 165-75.
253. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 32-33 (2d ed. 1996).
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churches, schools, and public health providers.254 Though there is
probably no bright line, the horizontal-competition rationale for the
deduction is weaker as services become more local by their nature. 
Alternatively, the lack of crowd-out among some donors might be
an argument not for elimination of the subsidy but instead simply
for multiple tiers of subsidy. Government could grant a lower
subsidy to those who do not face double payment, avoiding the
oversubsidization problem. A lower subsidy amount also mitigates
the distortionary impact of the subsidy. 
c. Public vs. Private Goods
Finally, broad-based services bolster both the horizontal- and
vertical-competition stories by making the good purchased look less
like a private good. Geographic concentration can be a stand-in for
production of mostly private goods, for which no subsidy is neces-
sary. More precisely, a highly concentrated service resembles what
economists call a “club good,” which is a good whose benefits are
shared among a finite group.255 Club groups often can overcome free-
riding problems, despite pooled benefits, because the small number
of players allows for direct negotiations.256 Social pressure to pay
one’s “fair share” is also a more powerful factor in small groups,
especially those, such as neighborhoods, that allow for face-to-face
interactions.257 
Thus, locally concentrated goods might not fully satisfy the
threshold condition for subsidies: private market failure. It is likely
that many localities would build parks with or without a subsidy
because of the disproportionate benefit that a park provides to its
nearest neighbors. But because of the free riding problem, it is very
unlikely that a city would establish a nature preserve to protect an
endangered chipmunk whose endearingly fuzzy existence is cher-
ished mostly by conservationists around the world. Subsidies are
therefore more necessary for the nationwide benefit of chipmunk
conservation than for the local park. 
254. See Fennell, supra note 128, at 6-9.
255. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 253, at 33-34.
256. See Lehavi, supra note 37, at 14.
257. Id. at 25-26, 42-48.
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3. Redistribution
A final factor that weighs strongly in favor of a subsidy for a given
organization is if its mission includes a significant amount of wealth
redistribution. Race-to-the-bottom dynamics among subnational
jurisdictions tend to increase the cost and reduce the efficacy of both
pure redistribution and redistributive regulation.258 That leaves a
significant opportunity for charity to outperform government. Note
again, though, that highly geographically concentrated redistribu-
tion may be problematic, as it may contribute to offsetting redistri-
bution upwards by local governments. 
One other caveat to the redistribution factor is that it stands in
some tension with the exit costs argument. As I have explained,
local governments can redistribute more effectively when the
amount of redistribution is less than payers’ exit cost. So as exit
costs rise, charitable redistribution’s comparative advantage dimin-
ishes. But this conflict is not inevitable. Exit costs need not be
uniform; individual donors could face high costs while regulated
firms or other taxpayers might be able to move fairly costlessly. In
that situation, the theoretical case for charity would be at its apex. 
4. Objections to Weisbrod, Reconsidered
One additional benefit of these three factors is that they also
defeat the objections—federalism, special-purpose governments, and
public choice theory—I raised earlier to the government-failure
theories. Obviously, the factors are designed to account for federal-
ism’s failings. The factors also favor situations that closely resemble
instances in which special-purpose governments will struggle: when
benefits cover a wide geographic area and when vertical competition
is important.259 
The factors also diminish the bite of public choice theory, which
might otherwise weigh against subsidies for higher-quality services.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 205-10.
259. Special-purpose governments are an unpromising source of intergovernmental
competition, because higher tiers of government often have both formal authority to limit
special-purpose governments and informal fiscal and political tools for reigning them in. See
Young, supra note 185, at 74-75. 
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Because only high-demand consumers would be willing to create a
second institution just to achieve higher quality, donors would be
relatively unlikely to free ride. Unless one accepts my earlier
suggestion that charity is generally more efficient than lobbying,260
this would imply that there should be no subsidy to encourage
higher-quality public goods because lobbying alone should suffice. 
The public choice critique is weakened, however, when exit costs
are high, benefits diffuse, and the good is redistributive. I have
already explained the redistribution point: redistributive goods are
more likely to generate concentrated and politically powerful
opposition.261 I have also shown that consumers of geographically
dispersed services have less political influence because of the in-
creased coordination costs of assembling and enforcing a coalition.262
High exit costs, too, reduce the power of lobbying by diminishing the
political influence of those who could otherwise have threatened
exit.263
I should also note that the addition of a comparative-advantage
rationale does not undermine the government-failure justification
for those narrow categories of charity that survived my earlier
critique. The two can be cumulative. But there are few, if any,
organizations that would be justified by government failure and not
by comparative advantage,264 so I will omit a separate analysis of
government failure going forward. 
5. A Summary, and Two Examples
Taken together, the comparative-advantage rationale for charity
suggests a fairly coherent legal ideal. As with any subsidy, would-be
producers should first show that market production alone would
be inadequate. The question then is whether the best corrective to
the private market lies in government or in subsidized charity.
Although no one factor seems dispositive, a charity can make its
260. See supra text accompanying notes 104-08.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75.
263. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 62, at 264-65 (explaining relationship between
exit threats and voice).
264. For example, all of the services with “strong” support under the government-failure
rationale are nationwide, redistributive, or both. See supra Table 2.
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strongest argument when government is at its weakest—as when
there are high exit costs, few possible government competitors, or
the good is redistributive—or when charity’s potential downsides
are mitigated, such as when the good is shared widely across many
jurisdictions and negative externalities are minimal. Part IV.B
details how this test could be administered. First, though, it may be
helpful to have an example or two of what my proposed legal norm
would look like in practice. 
Let us reconsider, then, the case for a subsidy for educational
institutions. Government failure does not provide a persuasive jus-
tification for subsidizing education, since consumers of education at
any given institution receive a private good, implying a strong
political constituency for funding their school. There is a robust local
market for education. At the same time, schools create localized
negative externalities by increasing noise and traffic and eliminat-
ing alternative uses for large land parcels. 
In contrast, national universities can make a strong argument for
subsidy as potential competitors for government. A school that
draws its student body from across the country, and sends its
alumni out across the globe, will tend to have donors who cannot
easily offset their gifts with lower spending on their various state
universities.265 This mitigates the waste of money given to infra-
marginal donors. The donors also could not easily band together to
lobby for higher quality from any one state university. 
The case is not as clear for some secondary schools and local
community colleges. When parents and alumni are clustered closely
together in a single political community, they are less likely to free
ride, enabling those who choose private school to reduce public
spending on schools.266 Those who seek to create public competitors
to existing schools are also more likely to do so, as the charter-school
265. University donors are overwhelmingly graduates of the school or parents of would-be
students. See R.G. Ehrenberg & C.L. Smith, The Sources and Uses of Annual Giving at
Selective Private Research Universities and Liberal Arts Colleges, 22 ECON. EDUC. REV. 223
(2003).
266. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 73-76 (2001); see Becker & Lindsay,
supra note 142, at 278, 294 (explaining that governments reduce spending on schools when
schools are privately financed); see also Lehavi, supra note 37, at 14, 25-26, 42-48 (describing
why local governments have less free riding).
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movement suggests.267 On the other hand, these predictions may
fail in larger or more diverse jurisdictions, such as states, rural
counties, suburbs that welcome many new migrants, or large
cities.268 Local private schools in those areas could plausibly argue
that they offer necessary competition that would not otherwise
arise. 
In either case, schools can strengthen their argument by also
serving as agents for social justice. Education can be a powerful
leveler if it is available to those of modest means. Thus, private
schools offering need-based scholarships, or schools collecting only
modest tuition, such as most community colleges, could also make
a strong argument for exemption regardless of their geographical
focus. 
In sum, these kinds of practical questions of politics and geogra-
phy form the bedrock of my proposed standard. Admittedly, the test
may turn on relatively nuanced facts. But to the extent this is a
problem, it can be mitigated with a procedure that softens the need
for most organizations to summon so much detail. 
B. Establishing Charitable Status
Although I have proposed a fairly detailed legal standard, it is
possible to design the test for eligibility so that it would be mostly
procedural, rather than substantive. The largest problems of the
charitable sector derive from the weak incentives of organizations’
principals to account for negative externalities.269 The application
process itself can shape these incentives, screening out many of the
worst applicants. Many others—those within the core of the three
factors I detailed—could be granted virtually automatic approval,
leaving regulators to focus their resources on the relatively small
number of borderline cases.
267. Christiana Stoddard & Sean P. Corcoran, The Political Economy of School Choice:
Support for Charter Schools Across States and School Districts, 62 J. URB. ECON. 27, 47
(2007).
268. See Briffault, supra note 128, at 399-422 (contrasting these situations with dynamics
in small suburbs).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
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The first way for the application process to shape applicant
incentives is if it establishes a “costly screen.”270 Costly screens are
a regulatory sorting tool in which applicants for some benefit must
incur a modest cost to qualify.271 The tool is most useful in situations
in which the benefit grantor would prefer to limit availability of the
benefit to those who value it highly—for example, because it is
costly to provide—but the grantor lacks full information about the
applicant’s preferences.272 If the process of obtaining the benefit is
costly in some way to the applicant, then only applicants who value
the benefit at more than the cost of the screen will obtain it. Thus
the screen obliges applicants to internalize some of the costs of
providing the benefit and to reveal the strength of their pref-
erence.273 Ideally, the screen will have differentiated costs, so that
those who value the benefit less will perceive the screen as more
costly, but that is not always achievable.274 
The second way in which the process can shape incentives is by
fostering internal deliberation. Scholars of administrative law have
shown that when planners know that their decisions will be
reviewed by someone who may disagree with their views, and the
process of planning is costly, the planners have strong incentives to
consider the views of the later reviewers.275 Therefore, requirements
to justify internal decisions to outsiders encourage insiders to take
account of others’ views. Just as agencies have become more demo-
cratic and deliberative as a result of the need to survive review by
270. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 687, 688-90 (2010) (describing costly screens in patent examinations); see also
Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial
Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 4-6, 16-17 (2008) (describing
“screening” concept as a technique of judicial review).
271. See Masur, supra note 270, at 688-90.
272. See Stephenson, supra note 270, at 11-15 (describing use of screen as solution to
information asymmetry).
273. Id. at 15.
274. That is, because the screen imposes some deadweight loss even on those whom the
government wishes to obtain the benefit, id. at 22-23, it would be preferable to be able to
differentiate the degree of effort required of different applicants. 
275. Seidenfeld, supra note 243, at 523-24; see also Stephen M. Bainbride, Why a Board?
Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 35, 38-41, 50-54 (2002)
(describing social science literature on impact of external accountability but arguing that such
accountability is undesirable if it undermines norms of board cohesion).
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potentially disagreeable judges,276 so too might charities become less
insular and less subject to confirmation bias and groupthink. 
Putting these two design features together, would-be charities
could be obliged to explain why their organization deserves a
subsidy, taking into account opportunity costs, moral hazard, and
other possible harms to others.277 Treasury officials would be em-
powered to consider these arguments and reject the application of
organizations that lack merit, albeit while subject to careful
oversight by layers of administrative and judicial review. At least in
difficult or borderline cases, outsiders would also be welcome to
comment on the officials’ own deliberations. Treasury officials would
apply a sliding scale of scrutiny, with organizations that meet most
of the key factors I have outlined able to obtain approval with
cursory explanation and little scrutiny.278 Those that appear to offer
minimal benefits, produce mostly private goods, or create serious
negative externalities would instead have a significant burden to
explain why they deserve subsidy. Periodic recertification might
ensure that organizations do not get slack after approval. 
This framework could open charitable governance to outside
views and influences with concomitant benefits to the quality of the
organizations’ deliberations. The weaker the benefits the charity
would offer, or the larger its harms, the heavier the burden of expla-
nation, and so the higher the costs of application for entrepreneurs
—and the supporters who must pay them.279 In all likelihood, many
organizations with dubious benefits would not bother to apply at all.
276. Seidenfeld, supra note 243, at 516-17.
277. One design question on which I take no firm position is whether a would-be charity
need consider purely ideological, or even racist, objections. My tentative view is that it should
not: if one goal of charity is to foster heterodox views, the mere unpopularity of the
organization’s views should not be a strike against it. See McCormack, supra note 72, at 995,
1013-14 (arguing that displeasure of racists and majority groups should not be a reason to
reject charity). But, admittedly, the line between ideological and other objections is likely hard
to draw.
278. Organizations carrying out inherently nongovernmental activities, such as religious
entities, would also probably be automatically exempt. 
279. In this way, entrepreneurs whose enterprises would create large social value, but
small private value for the entrepreneur, may still be willing to undergo the screening
process. See Masur, supra note 270, at 690 (noting that screening will fail to increase welfare
if there are significant numbers of applicants who would create large social value but assign
low private value to applying). 
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The procedure would likely need at least two important excep-
tions. First, small charities for whom the application or recert-
ification process would be a major administrative burden could be
exempted. In their case, the costly screen is too costly, because it
would eat up a disproportionate share of organizational resources,
and the cost to society of granting eligibility is small in any event.
Additionally, to preserve charities’ flexibility in the face of sudden
new needs, there could be an exception or expedited process for
emergency responses, such as earthquake or tsunami relief.280 
One other important feature worth consideration is to make
available multiple tiers of subsidy for applicants to choose from. For
instance, there might be two or three subcategories of § 501(c)(3),
with contributions deductible at different multiples of the amount
donated—say, 50 percent, 100 percent, and 125 percent.281 As noted
earlier, a lower but nonzero subsidy may be the best solution to the
problem that some, but not all, donors face double payment.
Allowing a partial subsidy also gives Treasury officials an interme-
diate option if they find an organization has a plausible but not
overwhelming case for subsidy; borderline organizations could
reapply for higher subsidies after they have built up a track record
of service. Furthermore, putting aside the mechanics of the appli-
cation process, having flexible subsidy amounts allows a more
efficient rate of subsidization. Subsidies should be set at the amount
that induces the optimal amount of charity,282 but currently the size
of the subsidy depends almost entirely on the donor’s marginal tax
rate, which has no obvious relation to optimal giving.283 If the
Treasury can adjust the multiplier for each tier of subsidy, the
subsidy rate can be decoupled from the marginal tax rate. 
280. I note, however, that current law allows organizations to obtain 501(c)(3) status
retroactively, which might make an emergency exception unnecessary. See HOPKINS, supra
note 141, at 855-56. 
281. I am grateful to Kirk Stark for this suggestion.
282. James R. Hines, Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment,
108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1214 (2010).
283. Gergen, supra note 1, at 1402-03.
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C. Dangers of Discretion?
I must acknowledge at this point that my suggestion of significant
government scrutiny of the purposes of charities is contrary to
existing law and to the views of nearly every other commentator.284
Pluralists, for instance, claim that allowing the government to
decide which charities may receive the subsidy would leave novel,
unpopular, or minority viewpoints unfunded.285 Welfarists suggest
that majority control would fail to reveal preferences of voters with
supramajority tastes for public goods.286 
Based on this logic, it could be further argued that government
must grant the deduction equally to all charities that produce public
goods, irrespective of their quality. It may be challenging to design
a system capable of making fine distinctions between different
organizational goals without permitting space for government
judgment about the desirability of those goals.287 For instance, we
may think that the comparative-advantage rationale for the
deduction is persuasive for producers of opera but not rock music.
But granting government the ability to choose which production
companies receive the deduction raises the danger that head-
banging aria haters at the IRS will do the opposite. 
Current law appears to reflect this thinking. In deciding what is
charitable, officials cannot deny an organization charitable status
because they dislike its goals, but instead can determine only
whether the entity performs a function that the for-profit market
284. An exception is Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay,
11 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 45 (2011).
285. See FLEISHMAN, supra note 249, at 22-24; Atkinson, supra note 1, at 636-37; Iris J.
Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs. Donor Empowerment,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1118-19 (2005); see also Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The
Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 342
(1976).
286. Hall & Colombo, supra note 1, at 404; Pozen, supra note 1, at 558-59; cf. Schizer, supra
note 15, at 251-52 (arguing that in this scenario, charities would be forced to lobby for
benefits).
287. Atkinson, supra note 1, at 636-37; Perry Fleischer, supra note 29, at 532-34 (raising
and responding to this argument); see NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM:
THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN NONPROFIT SECTOR 5-6, 42-81 (2001) (tracing the history
of judicial evaluation of charity in an effort to show that judicial decisions reflect the
judiciary’s policy preferences).
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does not.288 For example, rules for distinguishing permissible
“educational” activity from prohibited lobbying at least purport to
test only how the organization spreads its message, not the mes-
sage’s content.289 Although there is an exception to the definition of
charity for violations of “public policy,” the Supreme Court has
interpreted that exception to refer only to policies on which there is
near-uniform social agreement.290 Thus far, the only disqualifying
policies that the Court has identified are invidious racial discrimina-
tion and criminal enterprises; even charities that discriminate
based on gender remain in the clear.291 The Court has suggested
that the reason the public policy exception must remain narrow is
because government officials cannot be trusted to decide which
charitable endeavors are good policy.292 
This vision of charity law fails, however, because concerns about
government bias are overblown. The harm of excluding the occa-
sional borderline group does not obviously outweigh the benefits of
curtailing wasteful subsidies. Furthermore, governmental review
improves, rather than threatens, charity. Excluding harmful and
marginal charities is likely to boost the willingness of the public and
government officials to support the sector. Approval by officials who
are accountable to the public at large helps to ensure that charitable
goals are balanced against the possibility of externalities or con-
sumption of scarce resources that might be better devoted to other
charities. Surviving a formal review can also help the organization
288. See HOPKINS, supra note 141, at 158-63.
289. Id. at 261-67.
290. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593-96 (1983). For an insightful
discussion of the uncertainties behind the “illegal activity” prohibition, see Johnny Rex
Buckles, Reforming the Public Policy Doctrine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 397, 409-37 (2005).
291. David A. Brennen, The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public Policy,
and “Charity” in Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 391 & n.2 (2000); Nicholas
A. Mirkay, Is It Charitable To Discriminate? The Necessary Transformation of Section
501(c)(3) into the Gold Standard for Charities, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 45, 72-74. 
292. Although the Court is not explicit on this point, Justice Powell forcefully argued this
position in his Bob Jones concurrence, and the majority’s response was that public policy
violations could be found only when there was widespread social and political agreement. See
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 593-98 & n.23; id. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring). For scholarly
assertions of this point, see Buckles, supra note 290, at 457-59; Daniel P. Tokaji, First
Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2409, 2429-30, 2497-99 (2003) (discussing general tradeoffs between official discretion and
potential for discriminatory application).
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to cement its case to a skeptical public. Plus, the need to justify
charity to such officials may in itself lead to more internal delibera-
tion within the charitable organization about the place of its goals
within the larger society. For instance, an organization that
excludes women should be made to justify its decision against the
expressive harms that even its private decision may have on others.
The very act of considering and offering an explanation that could
be plausible to outsiders may begin to change the discriminatory
attitudes of the organization’s members.293 
These forms of balancing by officials can themselves be subject to
review in ways that limit the role of the officials’ subjective prefer-
ences. For instance, as I have mentioned, that is one goal of admin-
istrative law: to oblige the executive to justify its decisions based on
public reasons, taking into account all reasonable competing view-
points.294 To be sure, the effectiveness of judicial or other forms of
review depend on the reviewers. Administrators may blatantly
discriminate against some charitable enterprises, and courts at
times may let them. But stare decisis and norms of duty to follow it
will help constrain judges who might be tempted to give a pass to
harsh administrative treatment of organizations of which they
disapprove.295 And an agency that is unable ex ante to predict the
attitudes of its reviewing judges and is reluctant to waste resources
293. See Seidenfeld, supra note 243, at 524.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 275-76.
295. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
956 (2005). Admittedly, there is debate over evidence of the extent to which precedent limits
judicial behavior. Compare FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME
COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 32-56 (2000) (discussing the Chief Justice’s power to assign
majority opinions in order to set an agenda), and JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 80, 298-300 (2002) (finding that
judges pick and choose precedents in line with their policy preferences), with Jack Knight &
Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018, 1029 (1996) (noting that
Justices act out of a belief that following precedent is necessary to maintain legitimacy), and
Keith E. Whittington, Once More unto the Breach: Post Behavioralist Approaches to Judicial
Politics, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 617-18 (2000) (arguing that the pool of cases available
to the Court limits its ability to change precedent). Given the difficulties of interpreting the
empirical evidence, however, Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent,
7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 909-22 (2005), I am persuaded by the model constructed by
Abramowicz and Stearns.
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on a decision that will be nullified on review is more likely to act as
though judges will hold them to the letter of their obligations.296
In any event, any politicization of charity would not doom
unpopular projects. In fact, an extremist charity that fails to win a
subsidy is still quite likely to continue its mission precisely because
of the extremity of its positions.297 Recall that distant outliers know
that they cannot free ride on the efforts of others; thus, each mem-
ber is likely to contribute, regardless of subsidy. Each member will
lobby more vigorously for political approval. Even if approval is not
forthcoming, the government’s refusal further marks the charity as
an outsider, confirming to its members their inability to rely on
other contributors and strengthening their own resolve to contri-
bute.298
On balance, then, it is both plausible and appropriate for the law
of charity to distinguish between worthy and unworthy charities.
Indeed, current law overstates the need to curtail official determina-
tions of the merits of a charity’s goals. At a minimum, charities that
outright discriminate against others should have to justify their
exclusionary practices. 
CONCLUSION
I have offered here a new theoretical foundation for the law of
charity, one in which charity steps in when government falters,
offering competition when frictions reduce the pressure on govern-
ments to outperform local or national rivals. Charity also can supply
redistribution from or regulation of mobile taxpayers who otherwise
could be targeted only at great expense to local jurisdictions. Both
of these functions, however, bring with them some costs, such as the
danger that charities will generate burdens for others or allow
296. Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling
Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 64-65
(2000).
297. Cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-31
(1985) (making this argument to show that discrete and insular minorities may not require
judicial protection).
298. See  id. at 730-31 (suggesting that societal prejudice may strengthen political activism
of oppressed groups). This is not to deny that government disapprobation may carry a stigma
that can both harm the members and, in the long run, undermine their cause. 
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residents to diminish the tax base for pursuit of their own private
goals. 
This new formulation of the rationale for charity implies a
number of important policy recommendations, such as rules aimed
at limiting the possible downside of charitable endeavors. Although
it is too early for finely grained details, I have offered the first draft
of a new law of charity that attempts to sort more precisely welfare-
increasing charities from those that harm others or waste shared
resources. The hope is that the process of explaining their goals to
outsiders will open charity to a more diverse set of views and
perhaps also educate the public of the unique contributions of each
new proposal. 
My argument also has implications for a number of secondary
rules, such as the compensation and duties of officers in charitable
organizations, the role of charity in politics, and the nature of the
public policy exception to the definition of charity. First, in arguing
that more demanding procedures are consistent with the diversity
and independence of the charitable sector, I have also shown that
current doctrine is likely too timid in dealing with charities that
discriminate or otherwise violate public policy. 
Further, my analysis bears on the controversial questions of
political advocacy by charities and the compensation of their exec-
utives. I have already explained elsewhere that the comparative-
advantage rationale implies that for-profit charity, and existing
Treasury regulations allowing nonprofit executives to be paid
compensation “comparable” to executives at equivalent for-profit
firms, are wrongheaded and should be revised.299 Most commenta-
tors have struggled to find any normative grounding for existing
restrictions on lobbying and electioneering by charities.300 In my
account, however, charity is explicitly justified as an alternative to
government, so that allowing charitable dollars to be used for
lobbying for government services would defeat the whole point of the
subsidy. Both these areas deserve more detailed attention, but space
constrains me to defer that consideration to future work.
299. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii) (2011); Galle, supra note 18, at 1218-33. 
300. See Johnny Rex Buckles, Does the Constitutional Norm of Separation of Church and
State Justify the Denial of Tax Exemption to Churches that Engage in Partisan Political
Speech?, 84 IND. L.J. 447, 452-79 (2009).
